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ABSTRACT
Network coding is a novel technique that has a significant potential to improve
throughput, robustness and security of both wireless and wireline networks. With
network coding the intermediate nodes in the network have the capability to combine
multiple incoming packets and forward the resulting packets over their outgoing
links. This technique has a significant advantage over traditional methods such as
forwarding and duplication of packets. Recently, the network coding technique has
attracted a significant interest from the research community.
In this dissertation, we address a number of wireless network coding problems.
In particular, our work focuses on the Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE), one of
the central problems in wireless network coding. In Cooperative Data Exchange,
a group of clients that have a prior side information about a set of packets use a
shared broadcast channel to recover the missing packets from the set. We focus on
different variations of the problem, including data exchange in the presence of passive
and active adversaries, data exchange subject to deadlines, as well as serving clients
of different priority classes. For each variation, we analyze the complexity of the
problem and present exact or approximation algorithms for its solution. We show
that this set of problem is very rich and has deep connections to different areas of
coding theory, algebraic geometry, and information theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Wireless Network Coding
Today’s networks are designed and engineered to achieve high degree of scalabil-
ity, interoperability, and fault-tolerance. To meet these goals, the current network
architectures are highly distributed: the intermediate network elements (e.g., routers
and switches) make packet forwarding decisions in a highly distributed fashion. The
forwarding is typically performed on the hop-by-hop basis based on the source and
destination fields. This allows separation of flows and independent operations of
different network elements. While this approach performs well in many settings, it
is not optimal in terms of throughput, robustness and other performance metrics in
scenarios in which data sources are highly correlated, a side information is available
at the clients, and the clients are willing to collaborate to achieve their goals. Such
scenarios often appear in wireless and wireline scenarios.
The network coding technique, proposed in the pioneering work [2] by Ahlswede et al.,
generalizes the traditional forwarding approach by allowing the intermediate network
nodes to transmit coded combinations of packets. With network coding, the packets
in the network are considered to be symbols in a finite field. Sources and intermediate
nodes in the network can apply field operations to the incoming packets to generate
new packets, which are then forwarded to the next hop. The coding operations are
designed in such a way that the sink nodes are able to decode the packets they need
using the coded combinations they receive.
It has been shown that network coding provides significant benefits over packet
forwarding. Figure 1.1 presents an example (due to [2]) where the network coding
technique reduces the number of channel uses. Reference [3] shows that network
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Figure 1.1: An example of multicast network coding network. Each link in the
network has a capacity of 1 packet per network use. Both destination nodes t1 and
t2 want packets (bits) x1 and x2 from source node s. Without network coding, link
(3, 4) needs to be used twice to forward b1 to t2 and x2 to t1. With network coding,
only one channel use is sufficient.
coding can improve the robustness of the network in the presence of link and node
failures. Reference [4] shows that network coding can be used to provide security
against a wiretapper that can control a limited number of links in the network.
Initially, the attention of the network community has focused on network coding
for wireline networks. Following the seminal work of Katti et al. [5], there was a
significant interest in applying the network coding techniques for wireless networks.
Katti et al. [5] proposed opportunistic listening and opportunistic coding techniques
to leverage the benefits of network coding in wireless networks. With opportunistic
listening, wireless receivers operate in the promiscuous mode and store (for a short
period of time) all packets transmitted over the wireless channel, regardless of their
destination. These packets can be used later for decoding required packets. Op-
portunistic coding, on the other hand, is a strategy for transmitting coded packets
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during the time slots in which there is an opportunity to improve network perfor-
mance through coding. Following the works of Katti et al. [5], there was a significant
body of research on various aspects of opportunistic listening and scheduling as well
as on optimizing the performance of network coding techniques in wireless networks.
It was shown that the network coding technique has very significant advantages in
wireless settings and can lead to a significant improvement in network performance.
1.2 Contribution
We study several problems related to Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE) in
wireless networks. Cooperative Data Exchange, originally proposed by El Rouay-
heb et al. [6], is a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technique for exchanging information amoung
a group of wireless clients over a shared broadcast channel. While the basic CDE
problem was studied by several prior works, we focus on several important variations
that are relevant to many practical settings.
First, we focus on the Weakly Secure Data Exchange (WSDE) problem. We
establish the sufficient and necessary conditions under which a weakly secure solution
exists, and propose an algorithm that provides an exact solution for a feasible instance
of the problem. Next, we investigate the instances of the WSDE problem in which the
eavesdropper has a prior side information about the packets. Our results show that
it is possible to construct a weakly secure solution for settings in which the amount
of side information available to the adversary is bounded. We also show that the
security guarantees can be provided without any penalty in terms of performance.
In addition, we formulate this problem as a matrix completion problem and present
a random and a deterministic algorithms that can identify an optimal solution.
Next, we focus on two problems that arise in the content of cooperative data
exchange in the presence of faulty and adversarial clients. We establish the sufficient
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and necessary conditions for the existence of feasible solutions to these problems.
We prove that both of these two problems are NP-hard and present efficient approx-
imation algorithms that provide provable performance guarantees.
The third problem we consider is the cooperative data exchange with deadlines.
In this problem, each client has a deadline to complete the information transfer.
After the deadline expires, the client leaves the system and is not able to transmit
or receive any information. We consider two variations of this problem. In the first
variation, the objective is to maximize the number of clients that are able to receive
all packets. In the second model, the objective is to maximize the total number
of linearly independent combinations of packets known by all clients. We show that
both variations are NP-hard. For the second variation, we establish an approximation
algorithm with guaranteed approximation ratio.
Lastly, we consider the problem of Cooperative Data Exchange where a subgroup
of clients has priority over other clients. In this problem, a subset of the clients
has higher priority than the other clients. The primary objective is to minimize
the number of transmissions required to satisfy the clients with higher priority, and
the secondary objective is to minimize the number of transmissions to satisfy all
other clients. We show that this problem can be modeled by a linear program with
constraints corresponding to cut-set bounds. In addition, we consider the problem
model in which the side information of each client is a random subset of the ground
set X. For this model, we present the closed-form solution of the optimal schedule
and prove its correctness.
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2. RELATED WORK AND PRELIMINARIES OF COOPERATIVE DATA
EXCHANGE
2.1 Related Work
The network coding research area has been evolving since the initial work by
Ahlswede et al. [2]. The network coding technique has attracted significant attention
from both academia and industry. The initial studies focused mainly on constructing
network codes for multicast network which is modeled as a graph consisting of one
or more source nodes and multiple sink nodes. While network coding in wireline net-
works has been well studied, the use of coding technique in wireless networks received
significantly less attention from the research cummunity than wireline networks.
Traditional methods of improving the throughput of wireless networks focused
mostly on modifying MAC or TCP protocols for wireless networks or improving the
routing protocols in a wireless environment [7–9]. To the best of our knowledge,
initial attempts to explore the application of network coding technique in wireless
systems were published by Deb et al. [10] and Lun et al. [11]. Both papers aimed
at reducing the cost of packet delivery using network coding techniques. However,
they mostly apply algorithms developed for wirline multicast networks and do not
address fundamental challenges posed by the wireless medium.
A major breakthrough in wireless network coding was made in the work [5]
and [12] by Katti et al. In these papers, the broadcast nature of wireless network is
utilized by allowing wireless devices to listen to packets transmitted by neighboring
devices, regardless of their destination. This technique, referred to as opportunistic
listening, provides devices in the network with extra information that can be uti-
lized by coding strategies. Using this extra information, with appropriate coding
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scheme, the devices can mix packets from different information sources to improve
the overall throughput of the network. The corresponding coding technique is called
opportunistic coding.
Opportunistic listening and opportunistic coding strategies set the foundation of
wireless network coding schemes that leverage the broadcast properties of wireless
channel to improve performance of the network. Multiple wireless network coding
models were proposed based on these strategies.
Several articles consider wireless network strategies that take advantage of op-
portunistic coding. In [13], the authors proposed optimal opportunistic coding algo-
rithms for different types of mesh networks. Several other papers [14–17] focused on
a simpler one-hop network setting, in which the network consists of only two nodes
exchanging packets with each other and one relay node that can transmit and receive
from both nodes. These papers focused on finding the best scheduling strategy in
the network in terms of end-to-end delay and energy consumption. The paper [18]
focused on the rate region that can be achieved in one-hop network.
In addition, several network coding problems were proposed that involve both op-
portunistic coding and opportunistic listening techniques. Index Coding (IC) prob-
lem is one that received wide attention from the community. Birk et al. first proposed
IC in [19,20] in the context of satellite networks. In IC the clients in a network know
some information obtained by opportunistic listening and require certain packets.
The base station wants to broadcast packets to the clients and take advantage of the
side information held by the clients to minimize the cost of transmissions. Accord-
ingly, the main problem is to design an opportunistic coding strategy that minimizes
the total number of transmissions by the base station. In [20], several heuristic
algorithms for the IC problem and protocols for satellite networks were proposed.
Following [20], several follow up papers articles provided great insight into charac-
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teristics of the IC problem. Reference [21, 22] by Bar-Yossef et al. reformulated
this problem into a graph theory problem. They also conjectured that linear cod-
ing strategy has similar performance with non-linear coding strategy. Lubetzky and
Stav disproved this conjecture in [23]. Later, IC problem is proved to be NP-hard
in [24] and even hard to approximate [25,26]. Since then the focus of research in IC
problem was in finding its relations to other problems (e.g. [27]), special cases study
(e.g. [28]), and heuristic algorithms (e.g. [29,30]).
Another wireless network setting that uses opportunistic listening and oppor-
tunistic coding is Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE). Similar to IC, the clients in
the CDE setting use opportunistic listening to acquire side information in the net-
work. The difference is that with CDE, it is the clients that perform opportunistic
coding in order to minimize the transmission cost. Rouayheb et al. initially pro-
posed CDE in [6]. Later works [31–34] provided several algorithms for this problem.
Reference [31] and [32] respectively proposed random and deterministic algorithms
for this problem. Reference [33] applied a divide-and-conquer approach to obtain
the optimal coding strategy. Reference [34] addressed the fractional version of this
problem that uses the submodularity property of cut set bound conditions. Several
other works [34–37] considered variations of the CDE problem where cost, fairness
and multi-hop network topology are considered. Authors in [38] demonstrated that
CDE problem is closely related to the secret key agreement problem, which was orig-
inally formulated by Csisza´r and Narayan in [39]. Keller et al. [40] implemented a
system using CDE strategy on Android platform.
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2.2 Cooperative Data Exchange
2.2.1 Motivations
In recent years, there is a significant interest in cooperative communication in
wireless networks. Cooperative communication offers significant performance ad-
vantages and enables the network operator to address fundamental limitations of
the wireless spectrum. In particular, cooperative communication provides significant
benefits in hybrid networks where the clients can use a local network (e.g., WiFi)
to cooperatively recover lost packets transmitted over a long range network (e.g.,
cellular). The clients benefit from this strategy because the long-range connections
from a base station to the clients typically have lower throughput than the local
wireless connections of the clients. Using cooperative communication strategy may
reduce the traffic over the long-range network and can result in significant savings
for the clients.
2.2.2 Basic Problem Definition
The Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE) problem [6] aims to analyze the number
of transmissions required for exchanging data among a group of wireless clients.
The problem can be formulated as follows. A group of k clients {1, . . . , k} need to
exchange a set of packets X of size |X|= n. Each client i initially knows a subset of
packets Si ⊆ X and requires all the remaining packets in the set. The packets in Si
are referred to as a side information of client i. The packet exchange is performed
over multiple rounds. In each round, one of the clients transmits a packet or a linear
combination of packets in Si to all the other clients over a broadcast channel.
1 We
assume that the broadcast channel is lossless, hence all clients in the network can
1In general, a client can transmit a combination of packets in Si and packets previously received
over the channel, however, as shown in [41], this does not provide any advantage. Hence we assume
that the packets transmitted by client i are combination of packets in Si.
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correctly decode any packet transmitted over the channel. A client obtains all packets
from the transmissions received over the broadcast channel and its side information.
The CDE problem aims to minimize the number of rounds required so that all clients
can obtain all packets in X.
The CDE problem was considered in several previous works ( [31–35]). These
papers present both random and deterministic algorithms for the CDE problem.
It is worth noting that CDE is closely related to the problem considered by
Csisza´r and Narayan [39]. In this problem, X = (X1, . . . , Xk) is a vector of k
random variables over a finite field Fq, and {(Xj1 , . . . , Xjk)}mj=1 are m i.i.d. copies
of X. Suppose that these k sequences of random variables {Xj1}j, . . . , {Xjk}j are
collectively observed by k terminals. In particular, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, terminal i
observes the sequence {Xji }mj=1. The terminals exchange the information they have
over a noiseless public channel. Terminal i transmits mµi symbols, denoted by
Fi,1, . . . , Fi,mµi , which are random variables obtained by a map fi : Fmq → Fmµiq from
{Xji }mj=1 where µi is the rate of terminal i. Let F =
⋃
i{1 ≤ j ≤ mµi|Fi,j} be the
set of all symbols transmitted by all the terminals. The terminal i is said to have
achieved omniscience with rate tuple (µ1, . . . , µk) if for any  > 0, when m is large
enough, there exists f1, . . . , fk and a decoding function
di : Fmµ1q × · · · × Fmµkq × Fmq → Fmq × · · · × Fmq
such that
Pr
[
di(F, {Xji }mj=1) 6= {(Xj1 , . . . , Xjk)}mj=1
]
< .
The rate tuple µ¯ = (µ1, . . . , µk) is said to achieve global omniscience if it achieves
omniscience for all terminals. The formulation of Csisza´r and Narayan [39] can be
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seen as an information-theoretical reformulation of the CDE problem.
Reference [39] showed that the sufficient and necessary conditions for µ¯ to achieve
global omniscience can be expressed as the cut set bounds for all the possible subsets
of the terminals:
Proposition 1. A rate tuple µ¯ = (µ1, . . . , µk) achieves global omniscience if and
only if
µ¯ ∈ {(µ1, . . . , µk)|µB > H(XB|XB), B ⊂ [k]},
where H(·|·) is the conditional entropy function, µB =
∑
i∈B µi, B = [k] \ B and
XB =
⋃
i∈BXi.
Reference [34] proposed the algorithm to find the optimal rate tuple, which takes
advantage of the submodularity of the conditional entropy function and used a vari-
ation of Edmond’s greedy algorithm.
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3. WEAKLY SECURE DATA EXCHANGE∗
Cooperative data exchange aims to minimize the total number of transmissions,
or rounds, that is needed for for all clients to receive all packets in the given ground
set. This chapter focuses on the security aspects of the problem. We consider the
scenario where the packets transmitted over the broadcast channel can be intercepted
by an eavesdropper. Our goal is to establish a weakly secure data exchange scheme
that will prevent an eavesdropper from being able to decode individual packets from
the ground set or sparse linear combinations of the packets.
Our contribution in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
1. We formulate the Weakly Secure Data Exchange (WSDE) problem with and
without side information of eavesdropper.
2. We establish conditions under which the problem of finding a weakly secure
solution is feasible.
3. For feasible instances of the problem, we propose algorithms that provide
weakly secure solutions. We consider both settings in which the eavesdrop-
per has a side information about the packets and the settings in which the
eavesdropper does not have any prior side information about the ground set.
4. We show that when a solution for the weakly secure data exchange problem
exists, it requires the same number of transmissions as an optimal solution
∗Parts of this section are reprinted, with permission, from Muxi Yan and Alex Sprintson,
“Weakly Secure Network Coding for Wireless Cooperative Data Exchange,” in 2011 IEEE Global
telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM), Dec. 2011, c© 2011 IEEE, Muxi Yan and Alex
Sprintson,“Algorithms for Weakly Secure Data Exchange,” in 2013 International Symposium on
Network Coding (NetCod), Jun. 2013, c© 2013 IEEE, and Muxi Yan, Alex Sprintson and Igor
Zelenko, “Weakly Secure Data Exchange with Generalized Reed Solomon Codes,” in 2014 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Jun. 2014, c© 2014 IEEE.
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to the original (non-secure version) of the Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE)
problem.
5. We propose a matrix-completion approach to solve the WSDE problem, and
conjecture that the problem can be solved by applying linear transformation
of a known Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code.
6. We present a number of reformulations of the conjecture, which show that the
problem is a fundamental problem that falls in multiple sub-fields in mathe-
matics.
Related work. The consideration of security in network coding systems was
initiated by work of Cai and Yeung [4], where they showed that a well designed
precoding strategy can make the system secure against a wiretapper with access to
limited links in the network. This strategy is later extended by Silva et al. in [42].
They implement secure network coding with rank-metric codes with the property
that it can be applied to any communication network without knowledge of the
underlying network code. In [43], Bhattad and Narayanan proposed the concept
of weak security, where the traditional security requirement is loosen to trade for
capacity improvement. [44] extended this work to universal weakly secure network
coding with rank-metric code, which is independent on any underlying network code.
3.1 Weak Security
Traditional information theoretical security approaches usually use random keys
that are known to different parties in the communication to protect the information
to be transmitted, and aims at securing the transmissions in a way that the infor-
mation of an adversarial entity, e.g. an eavesdropper or wiretapper, can recover no
information about the information that need to be transmitted or shared. While such
12
type of security is essential in some occasions, the requirement that shared random
keys are known to different parties in the network may not always be met.
A more practical and light-weighted security approach called Weak Security was
proposal by [43] to address this problem. Weak security allows an eavesdropper to
acquire some information about the packets to be transmitted or shared. However, it
guarantees that these information is not ‘useful’ to the eavesdropper. For example,
in a linear coding system, it may be tolerable to let the eavesdropper know a linear
combination of several packets, but being unable to decode each individual packet.
Here we write the weak security condition in information theoretical language.
If we denote X = {x1, . . . , xn} as the set of packets to be shared by the clients and
P the set of coded packets observed by the eavesdropper, traditional strong security
requires that the eavesdropper can obtain no information about the packets, i.e.
I(X;P ) = 0 (3.1)
where I() represents the mutual information of two sets of random variables. For
weak security, the condition (3.1) is relaxed to
I(xi;P ) = 0,∀xi ∈ X (3.2)
In linear coding systems, suppose the packets xj take value from finite field Fq.
Coded packets P can be written as P = {p1, . . . , pµ}. Each coded packet pi is a
linear combination of packets in X, namely pi =
∑
j γijxj where γij ∈ Fq is the
coefficient associated with xj for coded packet pi. The strong security condition
(3.1) in linear coding systems requires that each coded packet, and any of their
linear combinations, must combine at least one random key. On the other hand, in
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linear coding systems, the weak security condition (3.2) is defined as follows.
Definition 1. In a linear coding system, weak security is achieved if for any packet
xj, there exists no coefficients λj1, . . . , λjn such that xj =
∑
i λjipi.
In other words, the eavesdropper is allowed to observed some coded packets trans-
mitted over the channel, but no individual packet can be recovered from these coded
packets.
A more sophisticated version of weak security involves the eavesdropper’s partial
pre-knowledge of the packets to be shared, initially proposed in [43] with the term
”weak security with guessing”. The goal in this version of weak security is that
when the eavesdropper knows a subset of packets, the transmissions obtained by the
eavesdropper do not reveal information of any other single packets. If we use Z to
denote the pre-knowledge of the eavesdropper, the weak security condition requires
that
I(xi;P |Z) = 0,∀xi ∈ X, (3.3)
where I(xi;P |Z) is the mutual information of random variables xi and P conditioned
on random variables Z. Let Z = {xz1 , . . . , xzσ}. In linear coding systems, the
condition is defined as follows.
Definition 2. In a linear coding system, weak security with pre-knowledge is satisfied
if for any packet xj /∈ Z, there does not exist coefficients λ1, . . . , λµ and λ′1, . . . , λ′σ
such that xj =
∑µ
i=1 λipi +
∑σ
i=1 λ
′
ixzi.
The notion of weak security provides an alternative approach to strong security
to achieve security in a communication system. It is preferable in situations where
pre-shared random keys are not available. In addition, as shown by [43], in a multi-
cast network coding system, achieving weak security does not incur any penalty in
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network throughput.
3.2 Weakly Secure Data Exchange
3.2.1 Motivation
The motivation of applying weak security during the process of cooperative data
exchange is to protect the packets broadcasted over the air against eavesdropper
without a key distribution system that is required by strong security or encryption.
In a wireless broadcast system, an adversarial device in vicinity can easily overhear
packets. Encryption in broadcasting system requires complicated key distribution
and user management systems that usually incur overhead and tradeoffs. Strong
information theoretical security requires random keys to be generated by clients and
distributed across the network. The key distribution process itself may not be secure
and takes network bandwidth to complete. Comparing to these two options, weak
security is an option that does not require key distribution at all.
3.2.2 Problem Model
Weakly Secure Data Exchange (WSDE) problem model extends the model of
Cooperate Data Exchange problem in [6,24]. A group of k wireless clients, numbered
1 to k, need to share a set of n packets X = {x1, . . . , xn} in the wireless broadcast
network. It is assumed that each packet is a random variable uniformly distributed
over finite field Fq. Each client i knows a subset of packets indexed by Si ⊆ [n],
referred to as its side information before any transmission happens. The indices of
the packets in each client’s side information are assumed to be known by a central
scheduler. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that any packet in X is known
to at least on client.
The broadcast channel shared by the clients is used by round. In each round,
one of the clients makes one transmission of a coded packet, which can be a linear
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combination of packets of its side information and any packet it receives previously.
The index of the client transmitted in round i is denoted as ti. The transmission is
received by other clients without any error or loss. The total number of transmissions
are denoted by µ. The coded packet transmitted in the ith round is denoted by
pi =
∑
γijxj,
where γij, i = 1, . . . , µ, j = 1, . . . , n are coefficients associated with packet xj in coded
packet pi. For each coded packet pi we use γi to denote the vector containing all of
its coefficients, namely
pi =
[
γi1 γi2 · · · γin
]
.
The vector γi is referred to as the encoding vector of packet pi. Let
Γ =

γ1
γ2
...
γµ

be the matrix of encoding coefficients of all coded packets transmitted over the
channel. Matrix Γ is referred to as the encoding matrix corresponding to a specific
coding strategy.
The encoding vector of an uncoded packet xj is denoted by uj, of which the jth
element is one and all other elements are zero. Vectors u1, . . . , un are referred to as
unit encoding vector.
An eavesdropper is assumed to present in the system. The eavesdropper can
acquire any coded packet transmission over the broadcast channel without loss or
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error. The eavesdropper may have pre-knowledge of a subset of packets indexed by
Z ⊂ [n] before the transmissions start.
The objective of WSDE problem is to find a coding strategy that: (i) allows each
client ci to obtain all the packets in X \ Si by received coded packets and its side
information; (ii) does not allow the eavesdropper to obtain any information about
any packet xi ∈ {xi|i ∈ [n] \Z} that is not known by the eavesdropper; (iii) uses the
minimum possible number of rounds.
Formally, the Weakly Secure Data Exchange (WSDE) problem is defined as fol-
lows. Given the number of clients k, the number of packets n, side information of
each client {Si}, side information of eavesdropper Z and the size of the finite field q,
find the encoding matrix of a coding strategy Γ such that:
Requirement 1. Each coded packet transmitted in the broadcast channel is
a combination of some client’s side information and coded packets it received
in the previous rounds:
∀i ∈ [µ], ∃` ∈ [k], γi ∈ span
 ⋃
j∈Sti
uj ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi−1}
 , (3.4)
where span(· · ·) is the linear span of a set of vectors;
Requirement 2. Each client can successfully decode all packets in X:
∀i ∈ [k], ∀j ∈ [n], uj ∈ span
(⋃
j∈Si
uj ∪ {γ1, . . . , γµ}
)
; (3.5)
Requirement 3. Eavesdropper cannot obtain information of any single packet
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Figure 3.1: An example of weakly secure data exchange. All three clients in the
network can recover all three packets from the two transmissions made by client 2
and client 3, while the eavesdropper cannot decode any single packet if it does not
have any side information about the set of packets X.
in X by observing packets transmitted in the broadcast channel:
∀j ∈ [n] \ Z, xj /∈ span
(⋃
j∈Z
uj ∪ {γ1, . . . , γµ}
)
. (3.6)
In addition, the number of transmissions µ should be minimized among all the coding
strategies that satisfy the above requirements.
An example of weakly secure data exchange is given in Figure 3.1.
The next proposition shows that without loss of generality, we can assume that
each client transmits only linear combinations of packets in its side information, i.e.,
if packet pi =
∑n
j=1 γ
j
i xj is generated by client cm, then γ
j
i = 0 if xj /∈ Sm.
3.3 Weakly Secure Data Exchange without Eavesdropper Side Information
We start with the analysis of WSDE problem with the restriction that the eaves-
dropper has no side information about the set of packets X, i.e. Z = ∅.
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c1
c3
c2
Figure 3.2: An example of an auxiliary graph corresponding to the instance of net-
work in Fig. 3.1.
3.3.1 Feasibility of Weak Security
We establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for the feasibility of a weakly
secure solution. Let I be an instance of WSDE problem. We first create an auxiliary
graph G(V,E) associated with I. The set of vertices in V corresponds to clients in
the network. For any pair of vertices i and j (i 6= j), if there exists a packet xm ∈ X
in the side information of both clients i and j, i.e., m ∈ Si and m ∈ Sj, then we add
an edge (i, j) to E, otherwise (i, j) /∈ E.
Fig. 3.2 depicts an example of auxiliary graph for the instance of the problem
shown in Fig. 3.1. Edge (1, 3) corresponds to packet x1 shared by clients 1 and 3.
Edge (2, 3) corresponds to packet x2 shared by clients 2 and 3.
We establish the necessary condition for the feasibility of a weakly secure solution
with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the auxiliary graph G(V,E) of an instance I is not fully connected, it
is not possible to find a solution to I.
In other words, a weakly secure solution exists only if the auxiliary graph G(V,E)
is a connected graph such that any node is reachable from another node in the graph
by travelling through a sequence of edges.
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Proof. Since G(V,E) is not fully connected, we can separate the graph into several
fully connected components G1(V1, E1), . . . , Gm(Vm, Em) where m ≥ 2. Each set
of clients Vi holds a set of packets, denoted as X
(i) = {xj|j ∈
⋃
`∈Vi S`}. Note
that based on the definition of the auxiliary graph, the sets of packets X(i) held
by different sets of clients Vi are mutually disjoint. Assume that a weakly secure
solution Γ exists. Since clients in V2 does not have any packets in X
(1), clients in
V1 must broadcast |X(1)| linearly independent combinations of packets in X(1) for
clients in V2 to decode all the packets in |X(1)|. However, this solution does not
satisfy the weak security requirement since an eavesdropper that does not have any
side information of X could also obtain and decode the same set of packets in |X(1)|.
By way of contradiction, no weakly secure solution exists.
Next, we establish the sufficient condition for the feasibility of a weakly secure
solution.
Lemma 2. If the auxiliary graph G(V,E) of an instance I is fully connected, then
there exists a feasible solution to I.
Proof. Let T ⊂ E be a spanning tree in G(V,E) (such tree must exist since G(V,E)
is a fully connected graph). Our solution uses the finite field F2 and each transmission
is a sum of exactly two packets. We select an edge e ∈ T and perform the following
operations. Assume clients 1 and 2 are those that correspond to the endpoints of
edge e and let x∗ ∈ X be a packet shared by these two clients (there must be at
least one such packet that corresponds to e). Then client 1 transmits, for each
packet xi ∈ {xi|i ∈ S1 \ S2}, the sum xi + x∗. Similarly, client 2 transmits xi + x∗
for each packet xi ∈ S2 \ S1. After these transmissions, clients 1 and 2 have the
same knowledge of packets in X. Therefore the two clients are effectively one client
in the cooperative data exchange network, in the sense that they share the same
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information of X and they can transmit the same coded packets. Thus these two
clients can be combined as a single client. We update the graph G(V,E) accordingly,
which is contraction of edge e. As a result, the auxiliary graph after update is still a
connected graph. The algorithm continues until all clients are combined as a single
client, at which time all clients know all packets.
Note that each coded packet transmitted over the channel is a combination of
two single packets over F2. Thus, the encoding vector of these coded packets have
even weight. This implies that any summation of the encoding vectors corresponding
to these coded packets will also have even weight. Hence no unit encoding vector is
in the span of these encoding vectors and the weak security requirement (Require-
ment 3) is satisfied. This implies, in turn, that the obtained solution is a feasible
solution.
Notice that the coding strategy in Lemma 2 is feasible but non-optimal. We will
provide a coding strategy that provides optimal solution in the next subsection.
Theorem 1. There exists a WSDE solution to I if and only if G(V,E) is fully
connected.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
3.3.2 Algorithm
In the previous section, we have derived the condition under which weak security
is feasible. In this section, we establish an algorithm for WSDE problem that provides
a feasible solution to a network instance that satisfies the condition in Theorem 1.
we will show that weakly secure cooperative data exchange can be achieved at no
extra cost, comparing to a cooperative data exchange solution without weak security
requirement for the same network.
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Let I to be an instance of WSDE problem. Reference [31] has proposed a random-
ized scheme that finds the optimal solution to cooperative data exchange problem.
We denote this solution as Γ. Note that Γ allows all clients to obtain all packets, but
it does not necessarily meet the weak security requirement (Requirement 3).
We proceed to describe our algorithm, referred to as Weakly Secure Data Ex-
change (WSDE) algorithm. The algorithm includes several phases.
Phase 1, invoke the algorithm in [31] to find an encoding matrix Γ that achieves
data exchange among the clients, i.e. satisfies Requirement 1 and 2. If the encoding
matrix Γ satisfies Requirement 3, then clearly it is also a solution to WSDE problem.
Suppose Γ is not secure and there exists certain number, say p, of unit encoding
vectors ui1 , . . . ,uip that belong to the row span of Γ. We denote the set of these
vectors as Uˆ . In this case we move forward to Phase 2. Note that if the number of
rows of Γ is n, i.e., achieving data exchange requires |X| transmissions over the air,
then it is not possible to define a weakly secure scheme. Otherwise, we note that
|Γ|−|Uˆ |> 0.
Phase 2, construct an auxiliary coding strategy corresponding to an encoding
matrix Γ′ that satisfies Requirements 1 and 2 but also includes vectors in Uˆ . The
matrix Γ′ is constructed as follows. We start with each row of Γ′ being one vector in
Uˆ . Then we iteratively process each row vector γ in Γ and check whether γ is in the
row span of Γ′. If γ is not in span(Γ′), we add it to Γ′, otherwise we proceed to the
next vector. We denote by B′ the set of rows of Γ′ that do not belong to Uˆ . Since
there are less than n transmissions in Γ and Theorem 1 is assumed to be satisfied,
the size of B′ is at least one.
Phase 3, we modify the rows in Γ′ that are also in B′. First, we write a vector
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γ ∈ B′ as
γ =
∑
uj∈Uˆ
ajuj +
∑
uj∈U\Uˆ
ajuj,
where aj are coefficient associated with uj. Then we substitute the row γ in Γ
′ by a
new vector
γ′ = γ −
∑
uj∈Uˆ
ajuj =
∑
uj∈U\Uˆ
ajuj. (3.7)
The process is repeated for all rows of Γ′ that are in B′.
Note that the new vector γ′ is a linear combination of rows in Γ′. Therefore after
the replacement, the row span of Γ′ does not change. In addition, by the construction
of Γ′, the row span of Γ′ and Γ are the same. The matrix Γ′ can be divided by rows
into two parts: (a) the set of unit vectors Uˆ and (b) the set of vectors B′′ that are
orthogonal to vectors in Uˆ .
The key observation is that after transmitting coded packets with encoding vec-
tors in B′′, all clients will be able to decode all packets xi whose unit encoding vectors
are not in Uˆ , in a weakly secure manner. Notice from the observation above that
|Γ|−|Uˆ |> 0 and |Γ|< n, so U \ Uˆ cannot be empty.
Phase 4, we select one of the vectors u∗ ∈ U \ Uˆ and substitute each vector
u ∈ Uˆ in Γ′ by the vector u∗ + u. The encoding matrix Γ′ obtained after this phase
is the output of the algorithm.
Lemma 3. The coding strategy corresponding to encoding matrix Γ′ satisfies Re-
quirements 1 and 2.
Proof. After Phase 1, Γ obtained from a CDE algorithm satisfies Requirement 1 and
2. Since Γ′ includes a subset of vectors in Γ and a set of unit vectors that are in
the row span of Γ, Requirement 1 and 2 are satisfied for Γ′ after Phase 2. In Phase
3, each vector in Γ′ is replaced with a linear combination of rows of Γ′ from the
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previous phase, and the support of the rows after replacement is a subset of the
support of corresponding rows before, so the row span of Γ′ does not change and
Requirement 1 and 2 are both satisfied after Phase 3 as well. In the Phase 4, some
rows in Γ′ are added with a vector u∗. The vector u∗ can be obtained by linearly
combining the previous rows of Γ′ and the unit encoding vectors corresponding to
local side information of any client, so the new coded packet can be transmitted
by the original client, and Requirement 1 is satisfied. In addition, since all clients
already know the packet corresponding to u∗, this term can be cancelled during
decoding phase and does not affect decoding of other packets, hence Requirement
2 is satisfied, We conclude that both Requirement 1 and 2 are satisfied after Phase
4.
Lemma 4. The coding strategy corresponding to encoding matrix Γ′ satisfies the
weak security requirement (Requirement 3).
Proof. First, note that from the definition of B′, the row span of B′ does not include
any unit vector. This still holds after vectors in B′ are modified in Phase 3.
Next, by way of contradiction, suppose that there exists γ in row span of Γ′ such
that γ is a unit encoding vector. We can write γ as a linear combination of j rows
of Γ′ in B′ (after Phase 3) and i rows of Γ′ not in B′, where i, j are non-negative
numbers. Note that i cannot be larger than one; otherwise, γ has two or more non-
zero elements that correspond to unit vectors in Uˆ , which contradicts the fact that
γ is a unit encoding vector. Also, i cannot be zero since span(B′) does not include
a unit vector.
Thus, the only possibility is that i = 1. However, in this case γ is a sum of a
unit vector uˆ in Uˆ , vector u∗, and possibly (in case j > 0) a vector that belongs to
span(B′). Therefore, if γ is a unit encoding vector, it might be the case that either
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x3, x4, x5
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Figure 3.3: An example of weakly secure solution against eavesdropper whose side
information includes a single packet. Here, all operations are over F5.
uˆ ∈ span(B′) or u∗ ∈ span(B′). Since span(B′) does not include unit vectors, this
results in a contradiction.
Theorem 2. Algorithm WSDE solves Problem WSDE in polynomial time.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the algorithms performs a polynomial
number of steps. The correctness of the algorithm follows from Lemmas 3 and 4.
3.4 Weakly Secure Data Exchange with Eavesdropper Side Information
The WSDE problem gets complicated when the eavesdropper is allowed to know
information about packets X prior to the data exchange. Figure 3.3 shows an ex-
ample of the Weakly Secure Data Exchange problem with eavesdropper having side
information.
We say a coding strategy has a degree of security of g if for any Z ⊆ X such that
|Z|≤ g, the weak security requirement (3.3) is satisfied. It is straightforward to see
that the degree of security of a coding strategy is closely related to the minimum
distance of the vectors in the row space of encoding matrix Γ. We denote by d(v) the
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Hamming weight of a vector v, i.e., d(v) refers to the number of non-zero elements
in v. Then, the minimum distance of vectors in the row space of Γ, referred to as
d(Γ), is defined as
d(Γ) = min
w∈W
d(w · Γ),
where W = F1×µ \ {0}. The following proposition captures the relationship of g and
d(Γ).
Proposition 2. A coding strategy with encoding matrix Γ satisfies the weak security
requirement for any Z ⊆ X with |Z|= g if and only if
d(Γ) ≥ g + 2.
The proof for Proposition 2 is very straightforward. If any vector v in the row
span of Γ has a Hamming weight of g + 1 or less, an eavesdropper which knows g
packets corresponding to a subset of the support of v can decode the other packet.
On the other hand, if all nonzero vectors in Γ have weight of at least g + 2, the
linear combination of the corresponding coded packet and any subset Z of g packets
can only be a linear combination of packets that are not in Z; otherwise it is a
contradiction to the fact the minimum distance d(Γ) of vectors in Γ is g + 2.
Proposition 2 implies that the larger the minimum distance of the encoding matrix
is, the more secure is the code, because it allows the eavesdropper to know more
packets as side information but still not be able to obtain any new packet. Therefore,
we redefine the WSDE problem as follows, referred to as Generalized Weakly Secure
Data Exchange (GWSDE) problem:
Problem GWSDE. For a network with k clients and n packets, where each client
has side information S1, . . . , Sk, find a coding strategy corresponding to an encoding
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matrix Γ ∈ Fµ×n that satisfies:
1. Each coded packet is a linear combination of some client’s side information
and any coded packets it received in the previous rounds:
∀i ∈ [µ],∃` ∈ [k], γi ∈ span
 ⋃
j∈Sti
uj ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi−1}
 , (3.8)
2. Each client can successfully decode all packets that it does not have:
∀i ∈ [k],∀j ∈ [n], uj ∈ span
(⋃
j∈Si
uj ∪ {γ1, . . . , γµ}
)
; (3.9)
3. d(Γ) is maximum among all Γ that satisfies 1 and 2.
3.4.1 Random Algorithm
We present a randomized algorithm, referred to as Algorithm GWSDE R, that
provides an optimal GWSDE solution for a network with high probability.
Algorithm 1 GWSDE R
1: Invoke an algorithm for CDE (e.g., due to [33]) and identify an encoding matrix
Γ′ that minimizes the number of transmissions
2: OPT ← the number of rows of Γ′
3: Let ti, i = 1, . . . , OPT be the client that transmits at round i (according to the
solution identified in the previous step.)
4: Let Γ = [γij] be an OPT × n matrix
5: for i = 1→ OPT do
6: for j = 1→ n do
7: γij ←
{
random number from Fq, j ∈ Sti
0, j /∈ Sti
8: end for
9: end for
10: return Γ
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Algorithm GWSDE R takes advantage of the previously proposed efficient al-
gorithms for CDE problem such as [32, 33]. In the first step, the algorithm ob-
tains an optimal encoding matrix Γ′ as CDE solution. Note that since the opti-
mal solution includes OPT transmissions, Γ′ is OPT × n matrix. The output of
Algorithm GWSDE R has the same dimension of Γ′. Moreover, according to Algo-
rithm GWSDE R, in each round i, a client cti which makes a transmission in the
CDE solution also makes a transmission in the output of Algorithm GWSDE R. As
a result the number of transmissions made by each client is equal in both solutions.
Note that Algorithm GWSDE R is essentially a matrix completion algorithm.
In particular, the purpose of the algorithm is to complete matrix Γ. Initially, each
row i of Γ contains unspecified entries (entries whose indices correspond to Sti)
and zero entries. The unspecified entries may take any value within the finite field
Fq. Algorithm GWSDE R substitutes unspecified entries by the elements drawn
independently and uniformly at random from the field Fq.
We proceed to prove the correctness of Algorithm GWSDE R. First we prove
that as the field size q → ∞, the encoding matrix Γ satisfies the Singleton bound
with high probability, i.e.
Pr [d(Γ) = n−OPT + 1]→ 1.
The proof is based on the following lemma from Cohen et al. [45]. For a matrix
G = [gij] with unspecified entries and two sets A ⊆ [OPT ], B ⊆ [n], denote GA,B as
the submatrix of G formed by intersection of rows not indexed by A and columns
not indexed by B, i.e. gij is an entry of GA,B if i /∈ A and j /∈ B. We say that A
and B cover submatrix GA,B if there is no unspecified entries in GA,B.
Lemma 5 ( [45]). For an unspecified matrix G, the maximum possible rank MR(G)
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of G after completion satisfies
MR(G) = min
A,B cover G
|A|+|B|+ rank(GA,B).
Now we consider an OPT × OPT submatrix G of Γ constructed by any OPT
columns. Denote the indices of the selected OPT columns of Γ as j1, j2, . . . , jOPT .
Notice that in our case, all specified entries of Γ are zeros, hence rank(GA,B) will
always be zero. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6. If we assign each unspecified entry in G with random value in Fq with
equal probability, then the probability of G being full rank satisfies
Pr [rank(G) = OPT ]→ 1
when field size q is large enough.
Proof. Suppose the total number of unspecified entries in G is b and denote them
as β1, β2, . . . , βb. It is clear that determinant of G is a polynomial function of the
unspecified entries. According to the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, if det(G) is not iden-
tically, equal to zero, then it holds that
Pr [det(G) = 0] = Pr [rank(G) < OPT ] <
OPT
q
(3.10)
if the unspecified entries are chosen independently and uniformly from field Fq. So it
is enough to prove that there exists one assignment to β1, . . . , βb such that det(G) 6= 0.
By the way of contradiction, suppose that any assignment to β1, . . . , βb results in
det(G) = 0, or rank(G) < OPT . Then by Lemma 5, there exists A and B that cover
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G such that
|A|+|B|< OPT .
Let i be one of the rows that do not belong to A, i.e., i ∈ A. The corresponding
client, cti , does not have packets Y = {xjm : m ∈ B} as side information. Hence,
it needs at least |Y | transmissions from other clients that contain information about
packets in Y . On the other hand, a packet transmitted in some round i contains
information of Y if and only if there exists m ∈ B such that gim 6= 0, where gim is the
entry of G indexed by (i,m). However, since A and B cover G and |A|+|B|< OPT ,
the total number of transmissions that contain information of Y is |A|< OPT−|B|=
|B|= |Y |. In other words, there is not enough information from other clients for
client cti to decode all packets in Y . Accordingly, Γ
′ cannot be a CDE solution for
the network. This results in a contradiction.
By union bound,
Pr [rank of some OPT columns of Γ is 0] <
 n
OPT
 OPT
q
.
Hence
Pr [d(Γ) = n−OPT + 1] > 1−
 n
OPT
 OPT
q
which approaches 1 when q →∞.
As we have proved Γ achieves Singleton bound with high probability, we now
claim that d(Γ) = n−OPT + 1 is the best minimum distance that can be achieved
by any solution to Problem GWSDE. This claim follows from the fact that OPT
is the number of rows of a solution to CDE problem. In other words, OPT is the
minimum number of transmissions such that all clients can decode all packets. If
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a solution has minimum distance d > n − OPT + 1, then by Singleton bound the
number of transmissions in this solution is less than OPT , which is a contradiction
to Requirement 2 of CDE problem.
Following from analysis above, Γ is the solution of GWSDE problem with high
probability. We conclude with the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For an instance of network for which OPT ≤ n−1, Algorithm GWSDE R
returns a GWSDE solution with degree of secrecy g = n−OPT − 1 with probability
at least
1− OPT
q
 n
OPT
 .
Theorem 4. For any network instance, the maximum achievable degree of secrecy
g is
g = n−OPT − 1.
Example 1. Consider the network instance in Fig. 3.3, which has k = 3, n = 5
and Si = {xi, xi+1, xi+2}, i = 1, 2, 3. By invoking algorithm in [33], number of
transmissions for each client in the optimal solution can be obtained, which is that
each client broadcasts one packet to other clients and OPT = k = 3. Thus we can
set t1 = 1, t2 = 2 and t3 = 3. In this way, the unspecified matrix Γ can be written as
Γ =

? ? ? 0 0
0 ? ? ? 0
0 0 ? ? ?
 .
The next step is to randomly and uniformly choose values from underlying field, e.g.
F64, for the unspecified entries. According to Theorem 3, with probability of at least
31
1 − 3
64
5
3
 ≈ 0.53, the completed Γ is GWSDE solution of the example network
instance.
3.4.2 Deterministic Algorithm
In this subsection we present our deterministic algorithm for GWSDE problem.
Our algorithm, referred to as Algorithm GWSDE D, includes the following steps.
First, similar to the random algorithm, we invoke algorithm for CDE problem to
obtain an optimal CDE solution Γ′. Next, we construct a solution Γ for GWSDE
such that at each round i, the transmitting client cti is the same in both solutions.
Then, we assign each unspecified entry γij of Γ (i.e. entry of G that corresponds to
a packet in Sti) to be the primitive element of an extension field of F2, such that the
extension fields are different for different elements. We claim the completed matrix
is the solution to the problem.
To establish the correctness of Algorithm GWSDE D it is sufficient to prove that
for every submatrix G formed by OPT columns of Γ, it holds that det(G) 6= 0.
Lemma 7. Let Γ be an output of Algorithm GWSDE D and let G be an OPT×OPT
submatrix of Γ. Then, det(G) 6= 0.
Proof. Let b be the number of the unspecified (non-zero) entries of G. We associate
unspecified entries ofG with variables β1, β2, . . . , βb. Note that Algorithm GWSDE D
assigns each βi a value which is a primitive element of F22` . Without loss of generality,
we assume that βi is indexed such that for each j > i it holds that βj is a primitive
element of a higher order field than βi.
We note that det(G) can be written as a multivariate polynomial P1(β1, β2, . . . , βb)
in β1, β2, . . . , βb. More specifically, P1(β1, β2, . . . , βb) is a sum of products, such that
each product contains exactly OPT terms and the degree of each variable is one. In
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm GWSDE D
1: Invoke CDE algorithm to obtain CDE solution Γ′
2: OPT ← the number of rows of Γ′
3: Let t1, . . . , tOPT be the client that transmits in each time slot in Γ
′
4: Let Γ = [γij] be a OPT × n matrix
5: `← 1
6: for i = 1→ OPT do
7: for j = 1→ n do
8: if j ∈ Sti then
9: γij ← primitive element of F22`
10: `← `+ 1
11: else
12: γij ← 0
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: return Γ
the previous section we showed that there exists an assignment of β1, β2, . . . , βb for
which det(G) is not equal to zero. Thus, P1(β1, β2, . . . , βb) is a non-zero polynomial.
By taking β1 out we can write P1(β1, β2, . . . , βb) as
P1(β1, β2, . . . , βb) = β1 ·Q′1(β2, . . . , βb) +Q′′1(β2, . . . , βb).
Note that either Q′1(β2, . . . , βb) or Q
′′
1(β2, . . . , βb) (or both) must be a non-zero
polynomial. If Q′1(β2, . . . , βb) is a non-zero polynomial, we assign P2(β2, . . . , βb) =
Q′1(β2, . . . , βb), otherwise we assign P2(β2, . . . , βb) = Q
′′
1(β2, . . . , βb). In the similar
way, we define non-zero polynomials Pi(βi, . . . , βb) for i = 3, . . . , b
′, where Pb′(βb′ , . . . , βb)
is a univariate polynomial Pb′(βb′ , . . . , βb) = βb′ .
Now, we show that if β1, β2, . . . , βb are assigned values as specified by Algo-
rithm GWSDE D, then all of the polynomials Pb′ , Pb′−1, . . . , P1 do not evaluate to
zero. First, since Pb(βb′ , . . . , βb) = βb′ , a non-zero assignment of βb′ implies that
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Pb′(βb′ , . . . , βb) does not evaluate to zero. Next, we assume that Pi(βi, . . . , βb) does
not evaluate to zero and show that this is the case for Pi−1(βi−1, . . . , βb). Note that
Pi−1(βi−1, βi, . . . , βb) = βi ·Q′i(βi, . . . , βb) +Q′′i (βi, . . . , βb).
Recall that βi−1 is a primitive element of some extension filed of F2, say F22` . Note
that each coefficient in {βi, . . . , βb} is assigned a value in F22l−1 . Then, polynomials
Q′i(βi, . . . , βb) and Q
′′
i (βi, . . . , βb) evaluate to an element of F22l−1 , and at least one of
these polynomials has a non-zero value. This implies that Pi−1(βi−1, βi, . . . , βb) will
evaluate to a non-zero value. The inductive argument implies that P1(β1, β2, . . . , βb)
does not evaluate to zero when the coefficients β1, β2, . . . , βb are assigned by Algo-
rithm GWSDE D.
We conclude with the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Algorithm GWSDE D returns a GWSDE solution if there exists one.
The required field size is O(2n
2
) bits each symbol.
Example 2. Consider the same network instance in Example 1. Instead of randomly
choosing value of the unspecified entries, algorithm GWSDE D completes Γ as
Γ =

α1 α2 α3 0 0
0 α4 α5 α6 0
0 0 α7 α8 α9

where αi is the primitive element of the finite field F22i . According to Theorem 5, Γ
is the GWSDE solution of the example network instance.
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3.5 Advanced Algorithm for Generalized Cooperative Data Exchange
The existing algorithms for WSDE problem, as described in the previous sections,
have certain disadvantages. To achieve the same probability of success, the field size
of both the random algorithm and the deterministic algorithm increases exponentially
with the input size, which makes them impractial to be implemented on a large
scale. In order to improve its performance, we approach WSDE problem is a more
sophisticated way: we first find an existing Maximum Distance Separable (MDS)
code, and then find one subset of codewords as its generator matrix that satisfies the
constraints of the configuration.
3.5.1 A detailed Analysis on Weakly Secure Data Exchange Problem
We summarize the most important conclusions in Section 3.4 as follows:
1. If a transmission scheme is weakly secure for any Z such that |Z|= g, then the
minimum weight of vectors in the row space of encoding matrix Γ is at least
Z + 2.
2. If µ is the minimum number of transmissions required to complete data ex-
change in a network, then there exists a WSDE solution if and only if
|Z|≤ n− µ− 2, (3.11)
or equivalently,
µ ≤ n− |Z|−2. (3.12)
3. If (3.11) is satisfied, then there exists a WSDE solution that uses µ time slots.
In addition, this solution is an MDS code.
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4. If (3.11) is satisfied, then for every CDE solution of the network, there exists
a WSDE solution of the same transmission schedule. uses the same schedule
The intuition of the conclusions above is that, if an eavesdropper has |Z| packets as
side information, then whether weak security can be achieved or not solely depends
on whether data exchange can be achieved with less than n − |Z|−2 transmissions.
Achieving weak security does not cost any extra rounds of transmissions comparing
to a CDE coding scheme.
The results above provide us with an approach on how a WSDE solution can
be found. Since a CDE solution can be found easily for a network using previous
work results ( [33], [32]), a WSDE solution can be found by reassigning coefficients
of the packets xi in each coded packet. In fact, in this way WSDE problem can
be reformed into a matrix completion problem (Figure 3.4. We first obtain the
transmission schedule {ti} from a CDE solution. Then we complete an incomplete
encoding matrix Γ, where γij = 0 if xj is known by client ti and γij is indeterminate
if otherwise. The objective is to assign values to the indeterminate elements in Γ
such that Γ is the generator matrix of an MDS code.
We summarize the WSDE problem in the following formal form:
Problem WSDE. For a given incomplete matrix Γ ∈ Fµ×n that has µ− 1 zeros in
each row and does not contain a zero submatrix of size a × b such that a + b > µ,
find a completion of Γ that satisfies the MDS condition.
In the previous section, the random coding technique corresponds to completing
the encoding matrix Γ by replacing each ‘?’ with a random value within the underly-
ing field Fq. To make a constant probability of success, the field size need to increase
exponentially with the size of packets n. The same problem exists for the determin-
istic algorithm in the previous section where the field size increases exponentially
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321
3
1
x3, x4, x5
x2, x3, x4x1, x2, x3
2 x2 + 2x3 + x4x1 + 2x2 + x3
x3 + 2x4 + x5
(a)
Γ =
? ? ? 0 00 ? ? ? 0
0 0 ? ? ?

(b)
Figure 3.4: An example of finding WSDE solution with matrix completion. A CDE
solution is found in (a) where each client transmits once. The corresponding encoding
matrix in the solution thus has a structure as in (b) where in each round the same
client transmits a packet. A ‘?’ refers to an indeterminate entry and a 0 means the
entry has to be 0.
with the input size.
3.5.2 WSDE Matrix Completion with GRS Code
We propose a smarter alternative approach to WSDE problem that eliminates
the exponential field size. As proposed in the previous section by Theorem 4, for
any network that requires µ < n transmissions to complete data exchange, we can
find a generator matrix of a (µ, n) MDS code as the encoding matrix of a WSDE
solution. Therefore, instead of randomly generating the encoding matrix, we first
find the generator matrix of an MDS code (e.g. Reed-Solomon code), then apply
linear transformation to this matrix so that it has the required zero elements.
In the following context, we call an incomplete matrix Γ to be a configuration.
If a matrix Γˆ has the same size as Γ, and all the determinant elements in Γ and
elements at corresponding indices in Γˆ are the same, then we say Γˆ completes matrix
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Γ.
To make the problem a bit more organized, we first create a modified instance
of the problem through a reduction procedure. Our reduction satisfies the following
conditions:
(C1) The minimum number of transmissions needed to satisfy the requests of all
clients is the same for both instances (i.e., the optimal solution to Problem DDE
has the same size for both original and modified instances).
(C2) Any solution Γ for the modified instance, which is secure against an adversary
with side information set of size g, is also a secure solution for the original
instance.
Our goal is to construct a modified instance that has a solution to Problem DDE
with the following properties:
(P1) Each client either broadcasts a single message or never broadcasts a message;
(P2) Each client that never transmits has exactly n−µ packets in its side informa-
tion set;
(P3) Each client that transmits has exactly n−µ+1 packets in its side information
set.
Our reduction includes multiple steps, each step satisfies conditions (C1) and
(C2).
Property (P1) can be satisfied by splitting each client into multiple clients that
have the same side information set. For example if client ci transmits three times, it
will be split into three clients, all of them have the same side information set Si. It
is easy to verify that conditions (C1) and (C2) hold for this reduction step.
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Property (P2) is also easy to satisfy. Indeed, suppose that client ci never trans-
mits, but has the side information set Si that contains more than n − µ packets.
Then, |Si|−n + µ packets can be removed from Si such that ci will still be able to
decode all packets in X. Indeed, it is easy to verify that there exists a subset of size
n − µ of packets in Si which together with messages in P enable ci to decode all
packets in X. Again, since this step only affects the clients that do not transmit,
conditions (C1) and (C2) are satisfied.
To satisfy Property (P3) several steps are required. In particular, we will modify
the side information set of one client at a time by removing redundant packets in its
side information set. Let cti be a client that broadcasts a message at round ti and
has more than n− µ+ 1 packets in Sti . Then, client ci will receive µ− 1 degrees of
freedom from the linear combinations A = {γ1, γ2, · · · , γµ} \ {γti} transmitted over
the channel. Then, only a subset S ′ti ⊂ Sti of size n − µ + 1 will be needed for cti
to decode all n degrees of freedom. Let B be a set of unit encoding vectors that
correspond to packets in S ′ti . Note that the vector γti transmitted by client cti can
be expressed as a linear combination of vectors in A ∪B,
γti =
∑
j:uj∈B
βjuj +
∑
γj∈A
βjγj, (3.13)
Let γ′ti =
∑
j:uj∈B βjuj =
∑
j:xj∈S′i βjuj. Note that if γti is substituted by γ
′
ti
,
the solution is still feasible. Indeed, each client can obtain γti by adding a linear
combination of the vectors in A to γ′ti . Accordingly, we can modify the instance by
substituting the set Si by S
′
i. Note that this step satisfies the conditions (C1) and
(C2). This step can be performed for other clients until Property (P3) is satisfied.
With this reduction, we now illustrate our new approach of solving WSDE prob-
lem. Our approach of using Reed-Solomon code to find the WSDE solution can be
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formalized as solving the following problem:
Problem WSDE GRS. Find a matrix G ∈ Fµ×n of the form
G =

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αn
...
...
. . .
...
αµ−11 α
µ−1
2 · · · αµ−1n

,where α1, . . . , αn are n distinct nonzero values from F, and a full rank linear trans-
formation matrix T ∈ Fµ×µ such that
Γ = [γij] = TG. (3.14)
Example 3. Consider the matrix completion problem in Figure 3.4. Since the net-
work requires 3 transmissions to complete data exchange, we first find a (3, 5) Reed-
Solomon code whose generator matrix G is:
G =

1 1 1 1 1
α α2 α3 α4 α5
α2 α4 α6 α α3
 , (3.15)
where α is a primitive element of F8. The matrix we want to complete is Fig-
ure 3.4(b), which requires the entries at certain indices to be zero. These constraints
can be met by applying the following transformation matrix to G:
Γˆ = TG =

α α4 α 0 0
0 1 α2 α2 0
0 0 α5 α3 α2
 (3.16)
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Γˆ =
 0 0 α5 α5 α4 α4α α 0 0 α3 α3
α6 α6 α2 α2 0 0
 =
1 α3 α31 α6 α6
1 α5 α5
 1 1 1 1 1 1α α3 α2 α6 α4 α5
α2 α6 α4 α5 α α3

Figure 3.5: An example where the transformation matrix T for a Reed-Solomon code
cannot be found.
where
T =

α2 1 1
α6 α6 1
α3 α4 1
 (3.17)
Since the matrix T has full rank, Γˆ and G are both generator matrices of the same
MDS code. In addition, Γˆ satisfies the zero constraints in Γ. Hence Γˆ is a WSDE
solution to the network.
The example illustrates that as long as the transformation matrix T is full rank,
the WSDE solution can be found. However, several counter examples show that for
certain RS code generator matrix G, a full rank transformation matrix T cannot be
found. One of such example is given in Figure 3.5. On the other hand, we did not
find any incomplete matrix Γ for which we cannot find a RS code with a generator
matrix satisfying the zero constraint. It leads to the conjecture below.
Definition 3. A µ×n configuration Γ satisfies No-Rectangle (NR) condition if there
does not exist a submatrix of Γ of size a × b such that a + b > µ and all entries of
this submatrix are zero.
A zero submatrix of a configuration is thus called a rectangle within this configu-
ration. According to [46], the matrix that needs to complete in the matrix completion
version of WSDE problem satisfies NR condition.
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We make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. For any configuration Γ that satisfies NR condition, let the generator
matrix G of a (µ, n) Reed-Solomon code be
G =

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αn
...
...
. . .
...
αµ−11 α
µ−1
2 · · · αµ−1n

. (3.18)
If α1, . . . , αn are taken value randomly in the underlying finite field Fq, then with
probability approaching 1, there exits a full rank transformation matrix T ∈ Fµ×µq
such that
Γˆ = TG (3.19)
and Γˆ is a completion of the incomplete matrix Γ.
The conjecture remains open for now. However, several published articles [1, 47]
describe multiple problems that are closely related to this problem. We first introduce
these problems, then establish multiple reformulations of our problem.
3.5.3 Related Problems
Multiple recent papers considered problems equivalent to WSDE GRS, including
[47] and [1]. Here we provide a brief introduction to both problems. It is worth
noting that only spacial cases are proven in both papers. The WSDE GRS problem
and all these problems stay open in general.
3.5.3.1 The GM-MDS Conjecture
Dau et al. established their problem in [47]. In this article, the authors want to
prove the existence of an MDS code over a field as small as q ≥ n + k − 1 whose
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generator matrix satisfies certain condition. The authors did not conclude the proof
to the existence of such type of MDS code. However, the authors managed to find
several conjectures that are equivalent to this statment. In addition, the article
showed that the conjecture is equivalent to the matrix completion version of the
Weakly Secure Data Exchange problem.
The conjecture in [47] is described as follows:
GM-MDS Conjecture ( [47]). Let M = (mi,j) be a k× n binary matrix satisfying
the MDS condition: ∣∣∣∣⋃
i∈I
supp(Mi)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ n− k + |I|,
for all nonempty subsets I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}, where supp(Mi) = j|1 ≤ j ≤ n,mi,j 6= 0
is the support of the ith row of M . Then for every prime power q ≥ n+ k− 1, there
exits an [n, k]q MDS code that has a generator matrix G = (gi,j) satisfying gi,j = 0
whenever mi,j = 0.
It can be easily proved that the condition described in GM-MDS Conjecture is
equivalent to the NR condition. The proof is provided in [47]. Hence the problem
established in [47] is equivalent to WSDE problem, since in both problems the ob-
jectives are to find MDS codes subject to the constraint of NR Condition or MDS
condition.
3.5.3.2 The Simple Multiple Access Network (SWAN) Problem
In the work [1] of Halbawi et al., the Simple Multiple Access Network (SWAN) is
defined. An instance of SWAN problem consists of a set of source nodes S, a set of
relay nodes V , and a destination node D. Each source node connects to a subset of
relay nodes by connections of information rate ri and the capacity from each relay
node to D is infinite.
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The objective of this problem is to construct a distributed Reed-Solomon code
when the rate of each source node satisfies certain cut set bounds with the presence
of adversarial relay nodes. In particular, the bound requires that the sum rate rI(S′)
from any subset S ′ of source nodes in S satisfies
rI(S′) ≤ CI(S′) − 2z, (3.20)
where CI(S′) is the min-cut capacity from S ′ to D and z is the number of adversarial
clients. The generator matrix of the distributed RS code is obtained by completing
an indeterminate matrix G. For each source node Si, there are ri exclusive rows
in matrix G corresponding to it. In any of these rows, the jth element is either
indeterminate, if source node Si is connected to relay node vj, or zero, if Si and vj
are connected. One example of SMAN and corresponding distributed RS code is
displayed in Figure 3.6.
It was proved by [47] that the SMAN problem is an equivalence to both the prob-
lems of finding a code that satisfies GM-MDS conjecture and the matrix completion
version of WSDE problem.
3.5.4 Proof for µ = 3 and µ = 4
As the proof to Conjecture 1 is still open, we consider the cases for small µ where
µ = 3 or 4 and provide the proof that Conjecture 1 is correct in these two cases.
We consider the case for µ = 3. First, there is a simple description of det(TΓ).
Let (i0, i1, . . . iµ−1) be a permutation of (1, . . . , µ). Now we mark some zero entries
in the configuration Γ according to the following rule: we do not mark any zero
entry in i0’th row, we mark one zero entry in i1’st row, two zero entries in i2’nd
row and so on. Assume that zero entries in Γ are replaced by αj’s as before. Then
(−1)µ(µ−1)/2 det(TΓ) is equal to the sum of all monomials obtained from the product
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G =

? 0 0 ? ? ? ? 0 0 ?
? 0 0 ? ? ? ? 0 0 ?
? 0 0 ? ? ? ? 0 0 ?
0 ? 0 ? ? 0 0 ? ? ?
0 ? 0 ? ? 0 0 ? ? ?
0 0 ? 0 0 ? ? ? ? ?

Figure 3.6: An example of SMAN problem network and corresponding indeterminate
generator matrix from [1]. In this example, r1 = 3, r2 = 2, r3 = 1. The first three
rows correspond to source node S1, the next two rows to source node S2, and the
last row to S3.
45
of all αj corresponding to the marked zeros with the coefficient equal to the sign of
the permutation (i0, i1, . . . iµ−1) (note that the sum is taken over all possible markings
as above). Note that the same monomial may correspond to different marking and
therefore may be canceled
A way to prove the conjecture is to choose a marking which corresponds to a
monomial that does not cancel by other markings. First we prove the following
general statement:
Lemma 8. (Partial induction step) Assume that Conjecture 1 holds for all con-
figurations of size µ. Consider a configuration Γ of size µ+1 satisfying NR condition
and there is at least one column in Γ with µ zero entries. Then det(TΓ) 6= 0.
Proof. By an appropriate permutation of rows and columns we can assume that the
first column of Γ contains µ zeros in the first µ rows. Removing the first column
and the last row from Γ, we obtain a configuration Γ˜ of size µ. Since Γ satisfies
NR condition for µ+ 1, then Γ˜ satisfies NR condition for µ (otherwise, if Γ˜ contains
a a × b zero submatrix with a + b = µ + 1, then we can attach the corresponding
part of the first column of Γ to this submatrix to get a × (b + 1) zero submatrix of
Γ, which contradict our NR condition for Γ). If Conjecture 1 holds for Γ˜, then the
polynomial representing det(TΓ˜) contains at least one nonzero monomial. Consider
the marking of zero entries in Γ˜, corresponding to this monomial. Then mark also
all µ zero entries in the first column. Then the monomial corresponding to this
new marking of zero entries in Γ in the polynomial representation of det(TΓ) is not
canceled. Indeed, assuming that it can be canceled, the canceling monomial must
contain factor αµ1 and must correspond to the marking with no zero entries marked
in the last row of Γ , which implies that the monomial in Γ˜ is also canceled.
The previous lemma is far to cover all possible cases if we want to make an induc-
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tion in µ, but it might be useful to at least cases of small µ. We say a configuration
Γ is totally sparse if all of its columns have at most 1 zero. Obviously monomial
corresponding to any marking of totally sparse configuration cannot be canceled, so
det(TΓ) 6= 0.
The case µ = 1 is void. In the case of µ = 2 the only configuration satisfying NR
condition (up to column/row permutations) is totally sparse. Now consider the case
µ = 3. In this case either there exists a column with 2 zero entries and we can use
Lemma 8 for µ = 2, or the configuration is totally sparse.
Next we prove the case for µ = 4. The proof for the case of µ = 4 is a bit more
complicated than the previous cases. We consider the following two cases:
Case 1: There exists a column with 3 zeros. Correctness of the conjecture in this
case can be proved by the partial induction step.
Case 2: The maximum number of zeros a column has is 2. To prove the conjecture
in this case, we define the merge and split operations on configurations.
Definition 4. Suppose configuration A can be obtained by replacing two columns in
B, in which they do not have any zero in the same row, with one column such that
the i’th element is zero if and only if the i’th element of any of the two columns being
replaced is zero, and then permute the columns. We say A is a merge of B and B
is a split of A.
Lemma 9. If det(TΓ) is a zero polynomial, then for any merge Γ
′ of Γ, det(TΓ′) = 0.
Proof. Suppose the number of columns of Γ is n. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that the last column of Γ′ is obtained by merging the last two columns of
Γ. Then the polynomial det(TΓ′) is obtained by assigning αn = αn−1 in polynomial
det(TΓ). This operation cannot change the polynomial from zero to nonzero. Thus
det(TΓ′) is also zero polynomial.
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Now we consider the following subcases:
1. There is a 2×2 zero submatrix in the configuration. Without loss of generality,
we suppose that in the configuration, the zeros in the first row are in the first to
third columns, and two of the zeros in the second row are in the first and second
columns. We mark all these five zeros. Now we need to mark one additional
zero in either row 3 or 4. If there exists a zero in column 3 in either row 3 or
row 4, then we mark that zero. The monomial corresponding to this marking
cannot be canceled because all the zeros in the first three columns are marked.

0 0 0 · · ·
0 0 ? · · ·
? ? 0 · · ·
? ? ? · · ·

In the other case, if there is no more zero in column 3 other than the one in
the first row, based on the NR condition, there must exist a zero in either row
3 or row 4 that is the only zero in that column. Without loss of generality we
may assume this columns is column 4. We mark this zero and claim that the
corresponding monomial cannot be canceled. This result follows directly from
the fact that all the zeros in columns 1 to 4 are marked.

0 0 0 ? · · ·
0 0 ? ? · · ·
? ? ? 0 · · ·
? ? ? ? · · ·

2. In the other cases, two rows can only have one zero in a common column. We
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start the proof with the special case where any two rows have one zero in a
common column. Up to permutation, there is only one such configuration:
Γ′ =

0 0 0 ? ? ?
0 ? ? 0 0 ?
? 0 ? 0 ? 0
? ? 0 ? 0 0

.
It is easy to verify that det(TΓ′) 6= 0 in this case.
Note that any configuration Γ we have not considered can be obtained by
a sequence of splitting operation on Γ′. By contrapositive of Lemma 9, the
determinant of transformation matrices corresponding to these configurations
are not zero polynomials.
Concluding the analysis above, determinant of the transformation matrix of any
configuration of size 4 that satisfies NR condition must be nonzero.
3.5.5 Reformulations for the Problem
Even though Conjecture 1 remains open, we found that the problem is equivalent
to a number of interesting problems within a broad range of subfields in mathematics.
These problems provide us a better insight into the keys and difficulties in solving
the WSDE problem with Reed-Solomon code.
3.5.5.1 Polynomial Reformulation
Since the transformation matrix T is determined once the parameters α1, . . . , αn
of G is determined, the determinant det(T ) of matrix T is a polynomial of the
variables α1, . . . , αn. Since we choose (α1, . . . , αn) uniformly, according to Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma, our statement in the conjecture is equivalent to the following state-
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ment: det(T ) is a non-zero polynomial of α1, . . . , αn. Equivalently, det(T ) 6= 0 in the
field Fq[α1, · · · , αn], where Fq[α1, · · · , αn] is the polynomial ring in α1, . . . , αn over
field Fq. The contrapositive of the statement is that, suppose det(T ) is a zero poly-
nomial of α1, . . . , αn, then there exists a zero submatrix of T of size a× b such that
a+ b > µ.
Let the transformation matrix T = [rij] and let {j : αδi,j} be the roots of the
polynomial
ri1 + ri2x+ · · ·+ riµxµ−1 = 0. (3.21)
If we normalize (3.21) such that the term of xµ−1 has coefficient 1 (this term must
have non-zero coefficient since each row of configuration Γ has exactly µ − 1 zeros,
suggesting the polynomial has a degree of at least µ− 1), then we can rewrite (3.21)
as
Pi =
(
x− αδi,1
) (
x− αδi,2
) · · · (x− αδi,µ−1) . (3.22)
In particular, since the ith column of matrix G is
[
1 α α2 · · · αµ−1
]T
,
if the element indexed (i, j) is zero, then the product of ith row of T and the jth
column of G is zero, which means αj is the root of polynomial Pi. Hence the roots {j :
αδi,j} of Pi correspond to the locations of the zeros in the ith row in the configuration.
We denote the set of polynomials specified by (3.22) as P . Note that P completely
specifies the transformation matrix G.
The polynomial reformulation follows from the contrapositive of the conjecture:
Polynomial Reformulation. If the polynomials P1, . . . , Pµ are linearly dependent
in the polynomial ring Fq[α1, . . . , αn], then there exists a subset of a polynomials in
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P such that they have b common roots in Fq[α1, . . . , αn] and a+ b > µ.
Example 4. Suppose that the configuration is
Γ =

0 0 ? ? ?
0 ? 0 ? ?
0 ? ? 0 ?

According to the equation
Γ = TG,
the transformation matrix T should be
T =

α1α2 −(α1 + α2) 1
α1α3 −(α1 + α3) 1
α1α4 −(α1 + α4) 1

and it can be verified that det(T ) = 0 in the polynomial ring Fq[α1, . . . , α5]. Accord-
ingly, the polynomials corresponding to rows of T are linearly dependent in the same
domain.
On the other hand, these polynomials can be written as
P1 = α1α2 − (α1 + α2)x+ α1α2x2 = (x− α1)(x− α2), (3.23)
P2 = α1α3 − (α1 + α3)x+ α1α3x2 = (x− α1)(x− α2), (3.24)
P3 = α1α4 − (α1 + α4)x+ α1α4x2 = (x− α1)(x− α2), (3.25)
It is straightforward that the polynomials P1, P2 and P3 have a common root α1.
Hence the polynomial reformulation of Conjecture 1 holds in this case.
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3.5.5.2 Combinatorics Reformulation
We establish a reformulation of WSDE problem which describes the conjecture in
the way of a combinatorics problem. This reformulation is not equivalent to WSDE
problem. However, it is very likely to be true and its statement implies the WSDE
conjecture. This reformulation is also mentioned in [47].
We denote 2M for a set M as all the subsets of M . For each configuration Γ, the
transformation matrix T can be written as the following form:

(−1)(µ−1)∏µ−1j=1 αδ1,j (−1)(µ−2)∑Λ∈2{δ1,j}:|Λ|=µ−1∏j∈Λ αδ1,j · · · 1
(−1)(µ−1)∏µ−1j=1 αδ2,j (−1)(µ−2)∑Λ∈2{δ2,j}:|Λ|=µ−1∏j∈Λ αδ2,j · · · 1
(−1)(µ−1)∏µ−1j=1 αδ3,j (−1)(µ−2)∑Λ∈2{δ3,j}:|Λ|=µ−1∏j∈Λ αδ3,j · · · 1,

where the element indexed by (i, j) is the sum of product of any j variables corre-
sponding to the ith row of the configuration. Let Σµ be the collection of permutations
of numbers 1 to µ. Then we can rewrite det(T ) as
det(T ) =
∑
σ∈Σµ
µ∏
i=1
riσ(i).
Thus any monomial in polynomial det(T ) corresponds to one or more permutations
σ ∈ Σµ from which the product of the elements (i, σ(i)) contains this monomial.
In addition, by the structure of matrix T , the jth column of matrix T consists of
monomials of degree µ − j. So each monomial in det(T ) has the same degree of∑µ
i=1 µ − σ(i) = µ(µ−1)2 . In particular, a monomial corresponding to permutation
σ(i) has the property that it is a product of (−1)µ, the sign of permutation σ, and
µ− σ(i) variables from {αδi,1 , . . . , αδi,µ−1} for all i = 1, . . . , µ.
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Example 5. Let the configuration Γ be
Γ =

0 0 ? ? ? ?
? ? 0 0 ? ?
? ? ? ? 0 0
 .
The corresponding transformation matrix
T =

α1α2 −(α1 + α2) 1
α3α4 −(α3 + α4) 1
α5α6 −(α5 + α6) 1
 .
The variables corresponding to row 1 are αδ1,1 = α1 and αδ1,2 = α2. Similarly, the
variables corresponding to row 2 are α3 and α4, and those corresponding to row 3 are
α5 and α6.
The determinant det(T ) of T has a monomial −α1α2α3 which correspond to the
permutation σ where σ(1) = 3, σ(2) = 2, and σ(3) = 1, since it is a product of
µ − σ(1) = 2 variables α1, α2 corresponding to row 1 and µ − σ(2) = 1 variable α3
from row 2.
The property of det(T ) above provides us another way to prove Conjecture 1. Let
∆i = {δi,1, . . . , δi,µ−1}. If we select a permutation σ of [µ] and select µ−σ(i) element
from ∆i for each i, each selection correspond to a monomial that may or may not
appear in det(T ). The existence of this monomial depends on whether the monomial
is canceled by another monomial of the same variables but different sign. We call
the selection of σ(i) and the elements from sets ∆i as one monomial selection. If
the monomial corresponding to a monomial selection cannot be obtained by another
monomial selection, we call the monomial selection to be unique.
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Combinatorics Reformulation. If a configuration Γ satisfies NR condition, then
there exists a unique monomial selection to the corresponding sets ∆1, . . . ,∆µ.
The correctness of this statement implies the correctness of Conjecture 1. Indeed,
if there is a unique monomial, this monomial cannot be canceled in the polynomial
det(T ), which thus cannot be zero. However, the correctness of Conjecture 1 does not
imply correctness of the reformulation because it is possible that there exist multiple
monomials of the same variables and degrees but their coefficients do not cancel each
other.
Example 6. Consider the configuration in 5. The corresponding sets are
∆1 = {1, 2} (3.26)
∆2 = {3, 4} (3.27)
∆3 = {5, 6}. (3.28)
Let σ(i) = i for i = 1, 2, 3 and select 3 from ∆2 and 5, 6 from ∆3. The corresponding
monomial is α3α5α6. It can be verified that no other monomial selection correspond
to α3α5α6 in this case.
On the other hand, consider the configuration in 4. The corresponding sets are
∆1 = {1, 2} (3.29)
∆2 = {1, 3} (3.30)
∆3 = {1, 4}. (3.31)
It can be verified that there does not exist a unique monomial selection for these
sets. For example, if we select σ(i) = i for i = 1, 2, 3 and select 1 from ∆2 and 1, 4
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from ∆3, the corresponding monomial is α
2
1α4. However, the same monomial can be
obtained by selecting σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 1, and σ(3) = 3, and select 1 from ∆1 and
1, 4 from ∆3.
This reformulation brings an interesting problem in combinatorics that what is
the condition for a certain monomial selection to be unique.
3.5.5.3 Computational Geometry Reformulation
In this part, we consider a slight modified version of the problem by allowing the
values of α1, . . . , αn to be taken in the real field R. However, the property of this
problem is very similar to the original problem and it is likely that the proof for
Conjecture 1 under both cases will be very similar.
We approach Conjecture 1 using rational normal curve. A rational normal curve
an be considered as the image of a map f : x 7→ (x, x2, . . . , xµ). We denote the
columns of the generator matrix G as v1, . . . , vn. To satisfy the constraint from the
configuration that each row i has µ− 1 zeros, using the same definition of δi,j in the
previous sections, the ith row ri of the transformation matrix must satisfy that
rivδi,j = 0 (3.32)
is satisfied in Fq[α1, . . . , αn] for all j = 1, . . . , µ− 1. Since αδi,j cannot take value 0,
the equation above can be written as
rivδi,jαδi,j = ri
[
αδi,j α
2
δi,j
· · · αµδi,j
]T
= 0. (3.33)
Consider each column of G as a vector in the vector space (Fq[α1, . . . , αn])µ. Then the
vector ri is a normal vector of the subspace spanned by the vectors vδi,1αδi,1 , . . . , vδi,µ−1αδi,µ .
We denote this vector subspace as Vi. By the property of a Vandermonde matrix,
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any µ columns of G are linearly independent, so Vi has a dimension of µ − 1. In
particular, since each vector vδi,jαδi,j corresponds to a point on the rational normal
curve in the vector space, the subspace Vi can be written as a hyperplane such that
µ − 1 different points on the rational normal curve and the origin point are within
the hyperplane. Note that by taking different values of the variables α1, . . . , αn, the
points that define the subspaces {Vi} are moving along the rational normal curve and
the subspaces change with the points. In total there are µ hyperplanes V1, . . . , Vµ
corresponding to all rows of T . By (3.33), their intersection V1 ∩ V2 ∩ · · · ∩ Vµ must
be orthogonal to all the rows in the transformation matrix T . If the rows of T are
linearly independent, then the dimension of the subspace spanned by all rows of T
is µ, which means the dimension of V1 ∩ · · · ∩ Vµ must be zero.
Following the analysis above, we can reformulate Conjecture 1 as follows:
Computational Geometry Reformulation. Let f1, . . . , fn be n identical points
on the rational normal curve. Let V1, . . . , Vµ be µ hyperplanes, each defined by µ− 1
points in {f1, . . . , fn} and the origin. Let V = V1 ∩ · · · ∩ Vµ. Assume that any
2 ≤ a ≤ µ hyperplanes do not have more than µ− a common points in {f1, . . . , fn}.
Then there exists at least one assignment of (α1, . . . , αn) such that V is of dimension
0, which is the origin of the space Rµ.
In this reformulation, the condition that any 2 ≤ a ≤ µ hyperplanes do not have
more than µ − a common points is equivalent to the NR condition in the original
problem. The statement that there exists α1, . . . , αn such that V is of dimension 0
is equivalent to that the transformation matrix T is full rank in the polynomial ring
Fq[α1, . . . , αn].
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4. ERASURE AND ERROR CORRECTING DATA EXCHANGE∗
Because cooperative data exchange is designed to be operated on a local area
wireless network with users with commodity hardware, these users and hardware may
not be reliable. Some of the most common reliability and security issues rise in such
scenario, such as loss of connectivity during data exchange or adversarial client. In
this chapter, we focus on enhancing the robustness and security by addressing these
two situations. In particular, we consider addressing these problems using coding
technique. During the data exchange process, the encoding scheme may let certain
clients to transmit more packets than needed as redundancy. In the cases where
some clients are faulty or some clients transmit faulty information, the redundant
messages can be used to compensate the lost messages or be used for forward error
correction.
An example of this problem is described in Figure 4.1. In this example, there
are four clients, each of them holds a subset of packets from the set {x1, x2, x3, x4}.
The solution to the Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE) problem is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.1(a). In this solution, client 1 transmits packet x1 + x2 + x3, while client 2
transmits packet x2 + x3 + x4. It is easy to see that with this solutions all of the
clients will be able to decode the packets they need. This solution, however, is not
robust to the situation when client 1 or 2 leaves the system. In contrast, the solution
depicted in Figure 4.1(b) is robust to a failure of any two clients, i.e. any client
without failure will be able to obtain all packets if two of the clients in the system
∗Parts of this section are reprinted, with permission, from Muxi Yan and Alex Sprintson, “On
Error Correcting Algorithms for the Cooperative Data Exchange Problem,” in 2014 International
Symposium on Network Coding (NetCod), Jun. 2014, c© 2014 IEEE, and Muxi Yan and Alex
Sprintson, “Approximation Algorithms for Erasure Correcting Data Exchange,” in 2015 IEEE In-
formation Theory Workshop (ITW), Apr. 2015, c© 2015 IEEE.
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Figure 4.1: An example of an encoding scheme that achieves data exchange and an
encoding scheme that is resilient to the connection loss of up to 2 clients.
fail.
Our contribution in this work is summarized as follows:
1. We define the problems of Error Correcting Data Exchange (ECDE) and Era-
sure Correcting Data Exchange (ErCDE).
2. We establish the sufficient and necessary condition under which correction of
g adversarial clients or g faulty clients is feasible.
3. We prove that an encoding scheme can fix error transmissions from g clients is
equivalent to the encoding scheme can repair from loss of transmissions from 2g
clients. This conclusion establishes the result that ECDE problem is a special
case of ErCDE problem.
4. We demonstrate that the ErCDE problem and ECDE problem are both NP-
hard.
5. We propose an approximation algorithm for ErCDE problem that achieve an
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approximation ratio upper bounded by g+ 1. The same algorithm can be used
to ECDE problem.
Related work. Multiple work considered robustness in network coding systems.
Reference [3] considered solving the problem of link failure with network coding. [48]
proposed the random linear network coding algorithm for multicast and prove that
this approach can take advantage of redundant network capacity for improved success
probability and robustness. [49] and [50] considered problems of applying network
coding in networks subject to packet loss. A recent work [51] looked into the problem
of error correction in cooperative data exchange under the constraint that each client
transmits exactly once.
4.1 Erasure Correcting Data Exchange
The Erasure Correcting Data Exchange (ErCDE) problem model considers the
case where the network has g unreliable clients. We assume the worst case that all
the transmissions from these unreliable clients are lost and cannot be received by
any client in the network. The objective of ErCDE problem is to find an encoding
scheme with the minimum number of transmissions such that all the reliable clients
can receive all the packets.
4.1.1 Problem Model
We define the problem of Erasure Correcting Data Exchange (ErCDE) based
on the model of Cooperative Data Exchange problem. An instance of the Erasure
Correcting Data Exchange model includes a set of k clients {1, . . . , k}; each of the
clients needs to obtain all the packets in set X = {x1, . . . , xn}. Each client i initially
holds a subset of packets Si ⊆ X, referred to as side information of client i, and is
interested in obtaining all other packets in X \Si. Each packet xj ∈ X is an element
of a finite field Fq.
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The clients use a lossless shared broadcast channel to exchange the data. Each
client can use the channel to broadcast the data to other clients. We assume that
the packets are transmitted by round; in each round a message is broadcasted. Each
message is a linear combination of the packets that belong to the side information
set Si of the transmitting client. We denote the message of round ` and the client
transmitting it in round ` by p` and t`, respectively. We denote by µ the total number
of transmissions.
We restrict the problem to linear coding, hence each message can be written as
p` =
∑
xj∈St`
γ`jxj,
where γ`j are encoding coefficients that correspond to that packet. The set of mes-
sages {p1, . . . , pµ} is denoted by P .
For clarity, we set γ`j = 0 for all j such that xj /∈ St` . Then, the set of encoding
vectors can be represented by the encoding matrix Γ = [γ`j], such that each row ` of
Γ contains the encoding coefficients of the message p`.
The combination of an encoding matrix Γ and the {t`} is referred to as an encoding
scheme, denoted by D = (Γ, {t`}). The number of transmissions made by each client
is denoted by µ1, . . . , µk.
Given a set of messages P , the degree of freedom of a client i is defined as di =
dim(P ∪ Si), i.e. the number of independent linear combinations of the X that i
knows. We say a client is satisfied if the coding scheme D enables it to decode
all packets in X, or in other words with the messages in D the degree of freedom
di = dim(P ∪ Si) of the client is n.
It is assumed that any client in the network is subject to failure. When a client i
fails, all messages p` where t` = i will not be received by the other clients. We call it
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an erasure of client i. We denote the number of possible erasures in the network as
g. The set of clients that are erased are referred to as the erasure pattern. The goal
of ErCDE problem is to find an encoding scheme D with the minimum number of
transmissions µ, such that when any g erasures of clients happen in the network, the
other clients are still able to decode all the packets in X. Such an encoding scheme
D is referred to as an ErCDE solution. An encoding scheme that allows all clients
which are not erased to obtain all packets but uses more than the minimum number
of transmissions is called a feasible ErCDE solution.
4.1.2 Intractability of ErCDE Problem
Though the ErCDE problem has a very straightforward problem definition, we
found that it is an NP-hard problem to find an ErCDE solution that is resilient to g
erasures of the clients for a given instance of network. In particular, it can be proved
that in the special case of g = 1, i.e. only one client in the network fails, the problem
remains intractable.
In this part, when we consider ErCDE problem, we focus on finding the sched-
ule and ignore the details of finding a specific encoding matrix, because when the
schedule is feasible, we can easily obtain an encoding matrix e.g. by random coding
or matrix completion strategy similar to [32,37].
Our proof of NP-hardness involves a polynomial reduction from the Minimum
Vertex Cover problem.
Minimum Vertex Cover problem: Given an undirected graph G(V,E), find
a subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V such that for each edge (u, v) ∈ E, at least one of u and
v belongs to V ′.
Given an instance of Minimum Vertex Cover problem, suppose that the vertices
in the graph are V = {v1, . . . , v`} and edges are E = {e1, . . . , em}, we construct
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Figure 4.2: An example of reduction from Minimum Vertex Cover problem to ErCDE
problem.
a polynomial time reduction to ErCDE problem with k = |V |+2|E|+1 clients and
n = 2|E| packets in the following way:
• The network has 2|E| packets. Each edge ei corresponds to two packets in X,
denoted as packet ei and e
′
i.
• For each vertex vi, we create a client vi in the reduction which knows packets
ej1 , . . . , ejd(vi) corresponding to edges incident to vertex vi in G(V,E), where
d(vi) is the degree of vertex vi.
• For each edge ei ∈ E, we create one client e1i , which knows packets ei and e′i,
and another client e2i , which knows packet e
′
i.
• We create one special client c which has empty side information.
An example of the reduction procedure above is shown in Figure 4.2. Let η be the
size of a minimum vertex cover to G(V,E) and let µ be the number of transmissions
in an optimal solution to the reduction. We claim that µ = 2|E|+η. The claim is
proved with the following two lemmas.
Lemma 10. µ ≤ 2|E|+η
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Proof. We denote the minimum vertex cover to G(V,E) as V ′ and thus |V ′|= η.
Based on V ′, we construct a coding scheme that uses 2|E|+η transmissions in the
following way:
• If vertex vi ∈ V ′, then the corresponding client vi ∈ C makes one transmission;
• Each client e1j and e2j makes one transmission.
To prove it is a feasible erasure correcting scheme, it is sufficient to prove that
client c can get all packets X when any other client fails. Since there is at most one
failure, we consider the following three cases:
1. If client vi fails, client c can decode packets ej and e
′
j with two transmissions
from clients e1j and e
2
j . It holds for any j ∈ [|E|]. Hence it is a feasible erasure
correcting scheme.
2. If client e1i fails, client c can decode packets ej and e
′
j (j 6= i) with two trans-
missions from client e1j and e
2
j . Also, it can get packet e
′
i from client e
2
i . The
only remaining packet ei can thus be decoded from the transmission of client
vh where node vh ∈ V ′ and edge ei is incident to vertex vh in G(V,E). Since
V ′ is a vertex cover, we can always find such a client.
3. If client e2i fails, a similar argument in case 2 applies, with a little tweak that
the transmission of e1i and vh are used together to decode both packets ei and
e′i.
Therefore the coding scheme is a feasible solution.
Lemma 11. µ ≥ 2|E|+η
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing that from an optimal solution to the reduc-
tion with µ transmissions, we can create a vertex cover to G(V,E) of size µ− 2|E|.
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We first claim that in any solution to the reduction problem, for any j, client e1j
and e2j each transmits at least once. Otherwise, only one client that knows e
′
j makes
transmission; any other client will not get e′j if this client fails.
In addition, as we mentioned in Section 4.1.1, there must be at least 2 clients
that knows ej and makes at least one transmission for any j ∈ [|E|]. Since among
the set of clients {e11, . . . , e1|E|, e21, . . . , e2|E|}, only e1j knows packet ej, there must be a
client vi that knows packet ej and makes at least one transmission. We choose the
subset of vertices
V ′ = {vi ∈ V : client vi makes at least one transmission}.
Each edge ej ∈ E must be incident to at least one vertex in V ′, i.e. V ′ is a vertex
cover to G(V,E). Its size is at most µ− 2|E|.
The following theorem concludes the two lemmas above.
Theorem 6. ErCDE problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 10 and Lemma 11.
4.1.3 Approximation Algorithm
In the previous section it has been shown that the Erasure Correcting Data
Exchange problem is an NP-hard problem, of which an optimum solution cannot
be obtained with a polynomial complexity algorithm. In this section we propose
a polynomial complexity algorithm that approximates the optimum solution within
a certain bound of the total number of transmissions that is used. Our algorithm
guarantees that for a given parameter g, the approximation ratio of the number of
transmissions is upper bounded by g + 1.
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In order to introduce the algorithm, we first establish the definition of a packet
map. We define the want set Wi of a client i as the packets that are not known by
the client and need to be recovered from messages from other clients: Wi = X \ Si.
Definition 5. A packet map with respect to a client i and a coding scheme D is a
one-to-one map f iD : Wi → [µ] from the want set of client i to the indices of messages
in D, such that the coefficient of a packet xj ∈ Wi in the message f(xj) is nonzero,
and client i can decode all packets in Wi with messages Pf iD = {p` : ` ∈ R(f iD)},
where R(f) is the range of f .
A packet map f iD can be found if client ci is satisfied in a coding schemeD. Indeed,
we can first find a subset of |Wi|messages Pˆi ⊆ P that satisfies i. Then the submatrix
Γi of Γ obtained by intersection of rows indexed by {`|p` ∈ Pˆi} and columns indexed
by {j|xj ∈ Wi} must be a full rank matrix. Hence by the property of a full rank
matrix we can always find a permutation σ of [|Wi|] such that the element in Γi
indexed by (σ(j), j) is nonzero for all j = 1, . . . , |Wi| (otherwise the determinant of
Γi, which is the summation of product of these elements in all possible permutation,
must be zero). These nonzero elements can be mapped back to the corresponding
elements in the original matrix Γ according to which rows and columns are selected
in Γi. Suppose that the jth row of Γi is row φ(j) in Γ and the jth column of Γi is
column ψ(j) in Γ, then f iD(xj) = φ(σ(ψ
−1(j))) satisfies the definitions of a packet
map.
A packet map has the following property:
Lemma 12. Let f iD be a packet map with respect to client i and encoding scheme D.
Then for any subset Wˆ ⊆ Wi of packets in Wi, if we replace each of the packets p`
where ` ∈ {f iD(xj)|xj ∈ Wˆ} with pˆ` = xj, then client i can decode all packets in Wi.
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Proof. Since Pf iD satisfies client ci, we can write any packet xj ∈ Wi as a linear
combination of side information of client i and the messages in Pf iD :
xj =
∑
xm∈Si
λjmxm +
∑
p`∈Pfi
D
ρj`p` (4.1)
where λjm and ρj` are corresponding coefficients. In turn, since the coefficient of a
packet xj ∈ Wi in pf iD(xj) is nonzero, we can rewrite pf iD(xj) as a linear combination
of xj, side information Si and the messages in Pf iD \ pf iD(xj):
pf iD(xj) =
∑
xm∈X γf iD(xj)mxm
=
∑
xm∈Si λ
′
mxm
+
∑
p`∈Pf\pfi
D
(xj)
ρ′`p` + ρ
′
f iD(xj)
xj.
(4.2)
Therefore, if we replace pf iD(xj) with xj, the information obtained by client ci does
not change and it can still decode all the packets. Applying the same argument for
all packets xj ∈ Wi concludes the proof for the proposition.
Definition 6. Suppose in a coding scheme D, the number of messages from each
client are µ1, . . . , µk and, without loss of generality, suppose µi ≥ µj when i ≥ j.
We say a coding scheme D satisfies (T, g, min)-constraint if the total number of
transmissions in D is T , and the number of transmissions
∑g
i=1 µi from the first g
clients are minimum among all the coding schemes that achieve data exchange with T
transmissions (if there are less than g clients, only count the number of transmissions
from the first k clients. The same rule applies in the following context). We call
a coding scheme that satisfies (T, g,min)constraint as a (T, g,min)-CDE solution.
The corresponding number of transmissions (µ1, . . . , µk) from each client is called a
(T, g,min)-CDE schedule.
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The algorithm for obtaining a (T, g,min)-CDE schedule for a given network will
be introduced in the next section.
Now we establish our algorithm for ErCDE problem, described in Algorithm 3.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the network satisfies the feasibility con-
dition that each packet is known by at least g + 1 clients, which guarantees that
a feasible solution exists. In this algorithm, g clients that have the most number
of packets as side information are selected as helpers, denoted as h1, . . . , hg. Our
algorithm attempts to satisfy the helpers first, then use the helpers to broadcast
messages to other clients. We denote the side information and want set of helper hi
as Shi and Whi respectively. Let Wh =
⋃
Whi . Other clients are called non-helper
clients and indexed by 1, . . . , k − g.
First, the total number of transmissions T in a (T, g,min)solution is enumerated
from 1 to the maximum possible value (g+1)n. One encoding scheme D(T ) is derived
for each value of T , which requires four steps. First, a (T, g,min)-CDE schedule is
found for the set of non-helper clients. Each non-helper client i transmits µi random
linear combinations of their side information in D(T ). We use v to denote the total
number of messages from the g non-helper clients with most number of transmissions
in the (T, g,min)-CDE schedule. Next, we find packet maps with respect to each
helper and D(T ). Then for each of the packets xj ∈ W =
⋃
iWhi , Rj non-helpers
other than client t
f
wj
D(T )
(xj)
that know xj is identified, where Rj = |{i|xj ∈ Whi}| is the
number of helpers that does not have xj as side information. Each of these clients
transmits uncoded packet xj once in D
(T ). At last, each helper transmits v random
linear combinations of their side information,
The following part of this section provides the analysis of Algorithm 3. Denote
an optimum ErCDE solution to the given network as Dˆ. Suppose in Dˆ, µˆh1 , . . . , µˆhk
and µˆ1, . . . , µˆk−g are the number of messages from each helper and non-helper client,
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Algorithm 3 ErCDE
1: Select g clients with most side information as helpers
2: for T = 1 to (g + 1)n do
3: Start a new solution D(T )
4: Find a (T, g,min)-CDE schedule (µ1, . . . , µk−g) for all the non-helper clients; if
such schedule does not exist, discard D(T ) and continue with a larger T
5: Each non-helper client i makes µi transmissions of random messages in D
(T )
6: For each helper hi, find packet map f
hi
D(T )
7: find Rj non-helpers other than client tfwj
D(T )
(xj)
that has xj as side information;
each client transmits message xj without coding in D
(T ); Rj is the number of
helpers that does not have xj as side information
8: Each helper hi makes v transmissions of random messages in D
(T ), where v is
the number of messages from the g clients with the most number of transmis-
sions in the (T, g,min)-CDE schedule in Line 4
9: end for
10: return the solution D(i) with minimum number of transmissions
respectively. Define µˆ as the total number of transmission in Dˆ and vˆ as the total
number of transmissions from the g non-helper clients which make the most number
of transmissions in Dˆ.
We first prove the feasibility of the encoding scheme.
Lemma 13. If D(T ) exists for some T , then D(T ) is a feasible ErCDE solution.
We assume an arbitrary erasure pattern occurs in which a helpers and g − a
non-helpers are erased. If a = g, i.e. when all helpers are erased and no non-helper
client is erased, Line 4 and Line 5 of Algorithm 3 guarantees that the non-helpers can
achieve data exchange with the (T, g,min)-CDE solution with high probability. The
conclusion follows from random linear network coding in Cooperative Data Exchange
(e.g. [32]). In addition, if the encoding scheme from Line 5 satisfies all the non-helper
clients, any helper hi can decode all the packets when it receives messages in D
(T )
with high probability. Indeed, since the helpers are selected such that they have
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more side information than non-helper clients, if the claim is not true, then at least
one message pj in the (T, g,min)-CDE solution from Line 5 does not increase the
degree of freedom of hi. However it implies the information about X that hi has is
a “superset” of client tj’s information about X. It contradicts the assumption that
client tj can obtain all packets (by the definition of (T, g,min)-CDE solution) but
helper hi cannot.
Now we show that when a < g, Line 7 of Algorithm 3 ensures that in D(T ) the
set of helpers collectively know all the packets.
Definition 7. Assume that a hypothetical client h is in the network and the side
information of h is the union of side information of all the unerased helpers. Then
we say that after receiving messages P the helpers collectively know all the packets in
X if the client h can decode all the packets X with its side information and messages
in P .
Lemma 14. When a < g, assume a client h has the side information of all unerased
helpers, then h can decode all the packets in X.
Proof. For each packet xj ∈ W =
⋃
iWi and any erasure pattern, consider the
following cases:
1. At least one helper that has xj as side information is not erased. In this case,
xj is side information of h.
2. All helpers that know xj are erased. Because g − Rj of the helpers have xj
as side information, at least g − Rj helpers are erased. Then at most Rj non-
helper clients are erased. Then by Line 7 of Algorithm 3, at least one of the
Rj additional clients and the client tfwj
D(T )
(xj)
is not erased. Hence h can receive
either xj or the message pfwj
D(T )
(xj)
. By Lemma 12, the client h can decode any
packet xj ∈ W in this case.
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Summarizing all the cases above, for any packet xj, the client h either has xj as side
information or can decode it from the messages it receives. We conclude that h can
decode all packets in X.
The lemma above shows that the helpers that are not erased collectively know all
the packets. Therefore, when each unerased helper transmits one random messages, it
is equivalent to that the client h which has side information of all helpers transmits
one random message. So Line 8 of Algorithm 3 is equivalent to h transmitting v
random messages to all other clients.
Lemma 15. When the encoding scheme from Line 5 is a (T, g,min)-CDE solution,
any helper hi and client j can decode all packets in X with high probability after
receiving v random coded messages from h.
Proof. As showed previously, the (T, g,min)-CDE solution from Line 5 satisfies all
the clients including the helpers, and any g clients make at most v transmissions.
In any erasure pattern, exactly g clients are erased, hence each client has at least
n − v independent linear combinations of packets in X. Then by the analysis of
Cooperative Data Exchange in [31] and the argument above that h can decode all the
packets, v random messages from h can satisfy all clients with high probability.
Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 guarantee that in any erasure pattern such that a < g,
all the helpers and non-helper clients can decode all the packets.
Proof of Lemma 13. According to analysis above, for any erasure pattern, including
erasing all helpers or erasing a helpers and g− a non-helper clients, any other client
can decode all the packets with high probability. Hence D(T ) is a feasible ErCDE
solution with high probability.
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Next, we bound the total number of transmissions achieved by Algorithm 3. We
only consider the iteration where T equals
∑k−g
i=1 µˆi, the total number of transmissions
from all non-helper clients in the optimum solution Dˆ. In this iteration, the number
of transmissions from Line 4 of Algorithm 3 is less than µˆ.
Lemma 16. |Whi |≤ µˆ− vˆ for all i ∈ [g].
Proof. By the property of ErCDE solution, in the optimum ErCDE solution Dˆ, if the
messages from the g (or k− g if k− g < g) non-helper clients with the most number
of transmissions are removed, the remaining messages can satisfy all the clients in
the network, including the helpers ientified in Algorithm 3. Therefore, the want set
of each helper cannot exceed µˆ− vˆ.
By Lemma 16 the number of transmissions in Line 4 is bounded by
g∑
i=1
|Whi|≤ g(µˆ− vˆ) ≤ g(µˆ− v).
The last inequality follows from the definition of (T, g,min)-CDE solution that v ≤ vˆ.
In total, the number of transmissions is bounded by
µˆ+ g(µˆ− v) + gv = (g + 1)µˆ. (4.3)
Theorem 7. Algorithm 3 provides a suboptimal ErCDE solution whose approxima-
tion ratio is upper bounded by g + 1.
Proof. According to Lemma 13, for any T where D(T ) exists, D(T ) is a feasible
ErCDE solution. In addition, when T =
∑k−g
i=1 µˆ, the number of transmissions in
D(T ) is upper bounded by (g + 1)µˆ. Therefore Line 10 of Algorithm 3 will return a
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feasible ErCDE solution whose number of transmissions is upper bounded by (g+ 1)
times of the optimum solution.
4.1.4 Obtaining (T, g,min)-Optimal Scheme
Algorithm in the previous section requires to find a (T, g,min)-optimal scheme to
a network. In this section, we establish the algorithm and show analysis to it.
Our algorithm is described in Algorithm 4. The algorithm runs by rounds. We
define di(`) as the number of linearly independent combinations of packets X that
client i knows before round i. In each round `, we find the client t` that satisfying
two conditions: 1) n − di(`) < T − `, and 2) it currently has the minimum number
of transmissions among all clients satisfying 1). The client t` transmits one random
message. We denote the degree of freedom of client i’s knowledge about X before a
round ` with di(`). Denote the number of transmissions from client i after round `
with µi(`). µi(0) is defined to be 0 for all i. If we can keep finding such clients for T
iterations, all the clients are satisfied and we obtained a (T, g,min)-optimal solution.
We denote this encoding scheme as D. Otherwise, such an encoding scheme does
not exist, and NO SOLUTION is returned.
Algorithm 4
1: for ` = 1 to T do
2: Find a client t` satisfying:
3: 1) n− di(`) < T − `
4: 2) µi(`− 1) is minimum among all clients satisfying 1)
5: if client t` is found then
6: Client t` transmits one random linear combination of its side information
7: else
8: return NO SOLUTION
9: end if
10: end for
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We prove that the algorithm returns a (T, g,min)-optimal scheme to the network
with high probability when there exists such a solution and returns NO SOLUTION
when a solution does not exist.
Lemma 17. If there exists an encoding scheme to the network satisfying all the
clients with T transmissions, then with high probability the T messages in Algorithm 4
satisfy all clients.
Proof. If there exists an encoding scheme satisfying all clients with T transmissions,
we denote this encoding scheme with D0. We prove by induction. Assume D`−1 is
a CDE solution that satisfy all the clients with the first `− 1 transmissions selected
by Algorithm 4. Then at least one client satisfies condition 1), which is the client
that makes transmission in round ` in D`−1. According to condition 1), at least one
transmission after round ` − 1 in D`−1 does not increase degree of freedom of the
client t` selected in Line 2. As proved in previous work (e.g. [52, Section III.E]),
by replacing this transmission with a random message from client t`, the resulting
encoding scheme D` still satisfies all the clients with T transmissions with high
probability. By induction, after T rounds, the T messages from Algorithm 4 will
satisfy all clients with high probability.
We next prove that the encoding scheme obtained by Algorithm 4 satisfies the
(T, g,min)-optimal constraint by contradiction. Without loss of generality, suppose
that clients 1, . . . , g are those with the maximum number of transmissions in D and
µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µg ≥ · · · ≥ µk. Suppose that there exists another encoding scheme D′
where the g clients with maximum number of transmissions are indexed by i1, . . . , ig.
Let µ′1, . . . , µ
′
k be the number of messages from each client in the encoding scheme
D′ and suppose µ′i1 ≥ · · · ≥ µ′ig . For the proof of contradiction, we assume that
73
λg(D
′) =
∑
j µ
′
ij
<
∑
j µj = λg(D), and our objective is to find contradiction under
this assumption.
Denote the maximum number of transmissions that can be made from each client
to be {A1, . . . , Ak}, where Aj = T − n+ |Sj|. Note that by Algorithm 4, each client
j can make Aj transmissions without violating condition 1).
Lemma 18. For any j /∈ {1, . . . , g}, if µj < Aj, then
µj ≥ µ1 − 1. (4.4)
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume for some j ∈ {1, . . . , g}, µj < Aj and
µ1 − µj >= 2, then in at least one round ` Algorithm 4 selects client t` = 1 to make
one transmission and the difference between the number of transmissions from client
1 and j changes from 1 to 2. However, this is not possible due to the way Algorithm 4
selects t`: since client j has less number of transmissions and satisfies condition 1),
t` cannot be 1. The lemma then holds by this contradiction.
Lemma 19. If λg(D
′) =
∑g
j=1 µ
′
ij
<
∑g
j=1 µj = λg(D), then
∑
j /∈{i1,...,ig}
µ′j ≤
∑
j /∈{1,...,g}
µj. (4.5)
Proof. First, we claim that for any j such that j /∈ {1, . . . , g} ∪ {i1, . . . , ig}, µ′j ≤ µj.
Assume it is not true and for some j∗, µ′j∗ > µj∗ . Then it is straightforward that
µj∗ < Aj∗ , so µj∗ ≥ µ1 − 1 and µ′j∗ ≥ µ1 by Lemma 18, thus µ′ig ≥ µ′j∗ ≥ µ1. It is a
contradiction to the assumption that λg(D
′) < λg(D).
Next, we claim that for any j such that j ∈ {i1, . . . , ig} \ {1, . . . , g} and any m
such that m ∈ {1, . . . , g} \ {i1, . . . , ig}, it holds that µ′m ≤ µj. Consider two cases:
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1. If µj = Aj, then
µ′m ≤ µ′ig ≤ µ′j ≤ Aj = µj.
2. If µj < Aj, then µj ≥ µ1 − 1 by Lemma 18. If µ′m > µj, then µ′m ≥ µ1,
thus µ′ig ≥ µ′m ≥ µ1, which is a contradiction to the assumption that λg(D′) <
λg(D). Therefore µ
′
m ≤ µj.
Using the two arguments above,
∑
j /∈{i1,...,ig}
µ′j =
∑
j /∈ {i1, . . . , ig}
j ∈ {1, . . . , g}
µ′j +
∑
j /∈ {i1, . . . , ig}
j /∈ {1, . . . , g}
µ′j
≤
∑
j ∈ {i1, . . . , ig}
j /∈ {1, . . . , g}
µj +
∑
j /∈ {i1, . . . , ig}
j /∈ {1, . . . , g}
µj
=
∑
j /∈{1,...,g}
µj (4.6)
A contradiction can be established using Lemma 19, since
k∑
j=1
µ′k =
∑
j∈{i1,...,ig}
µ′j +
∑
j /∈{i1,...,ig}
µ′j
<
∑
j∈{1,...,g}
µj +
∑
j /∈{1,...,g}
µj = T. (4.7)
Equation (4.7) contradicts the fact that there are T transmissions in solution D′. By
this contradiction, D is a (T, g,min)-optimal solution.
Theorem 8. With high probability, Algorithm 4 returns a (T, g,min)-optimal scheme
when there exists a (T, g,min)-optimal solution.
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Proof. Lemma 17 shows the encoding schemeD is a feasible CDE solution. Lemma 19
and the following analysis shows that λg(D) is minimized among all feasible CDE
solution with T transmissions. Therefore the encoding scheme D obtained by Algo-
rithm 4 is a (T, g,min)-optimal solution with high probability.
4.2 Error Correcting Data Exchange
In this section we consider solving another issue that may occur in the cooper-
ative data exchange network. As mentioned above, the cooperative data exchange
network is mostly ad-hoc and the clients in it are mostly commodity devices that are
controlled by users. The nature of a CDE network imposes a substantial potential of
adversarial activities from the devices that participate in the network. For example,
an adversarial device may attempt to prevent other clients to decode packet correctly
by transmitting incorrect messages during their transmission.
We assume that certain number of clients in the CDE network can create Byzan-
tine error in the messages they transmit, i.e. the value of the messages they transmit
may not be the correct linear combinaton specified by the encoding vector. The
objective of our problem, referred to as Error Correcting Data Exchange, is to devise
an encoding scheme for a given network such that when any g of the clients are
Byzantine clients, the other clients can still decode all packets correctly.
4.2.1 Problem Model
The definition of ECDE problem is similar to that of ErCDE problem. An in-
stance of ECDE problem includes k clients indexed by {1, . . . , k} and n packets
X = {X1, . . . , Xn}. The n packets in X are elements of an underlying finite field Fq
of size q. Each client i knows the values of a subset of packets Si ⊂ X, referred as
its side information. For clarity, we also define vectors X =
[
X1 · · · Xn
]T
and
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Si =
[
Xj1 · · · Xj|Si|
]T
where Xj` ∈ Si.
We further define the unit vector ui, i = 1, . . . , n as the vector whose i’th element
is 1 and all other elements are 0, i.e.
ui = [0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i− 1 zeros
1 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− i zeros
].
Let
U i =
[
uTj1 u
T
j2
· · · uTj|Si|
]T
where i ∈ [k] and j1, . . . , j|Si| are indices of packets in Si.
Following the definition of CDE problem, the channel is used by round, indexed
by 1, 2, . . . , µ, where µ is the number of packets transmitted by the algorithm. At
each slot, one of the clients broadcasts a packet or a linear combination of packets.
We assume that the broadcast channel is noiseless, hence all of the clients can obtain
the transmitted packets without error.
We focus on a centralized algorithm that determines, for each time slot i, the
client ti that will be transmitting at that time slot, as well as the corresponding
encoding matrix Γ = [γij] ∈ Fµ×nq . The ith row γi of Γ corresponds to the time slot i
and defines the linear combination transmitted by client ti. Without loss of generality
we can assume that each client i can only transmit a combination of packets in Si.
Thus, γi,j = 0 for all (i, j) such that Xj /∈ Sti .
Let Pi be the packet transmitted at time slot i by client ti. If ti is not a faulty
client, then
Pi = γiX. (4.8)
We assume that at most a out of k clients are faulty. We denote their indices
by A ⊆ [k], where [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}. If ti ∈ A, then Pi does not satisfy (4.8)
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and can have any value in Fq. We denote the sequence of broadcasted packets by
P =
[
P1 · · · Pµ
]T
.
Each client attempts to decode the packets in X after it receives all trans-
mitted packets P . If client i’s decoder can determine X, its output is Xˆ i =[
Xˆ1i · · · Xˆni
]T
. Our goal is to find a solution that allows all non-faulty clients
{i /∈ A} to correctly decode all the packets in X, i.e., Xˆ i = X, regardless of the
packets transmitted by faulty clients {i ∈ A}.
Each client ` uses both its side information S` and the transmissions P from the
broadcast channel to decode the packets it needs. If there is no error in P , then the
following equation holds: P
S`
 =
 Γ
U `
X. (4.9)
However, because of the existence of faulty clients, the transmissions P are sub-
ject to errors: P
S`
 =
 Γ
U `
X + e, (4.10)
where e ∈ F(µ+|S`|)×1q is the error pattern caused by the faulty clients. Note that the
error pattern e cannot be arbitrary since at most a = |A| clients can be faulty. We
write e =
[
e1 · · · eµ 0 · · · 0
]T
. The constraint on the error pattern e can be
written as
|{ti : i ∈ [µ], ei 6= 0}| ≤ a. (4.11)
We say that an error pattern is valid if it satisfies (4.11).
Note that a client ` can correctly decode X if and only if there exists exactly one
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solution Xˆ = X to the equation
P
S`
 =
 Γ
U `
 Xˆ + e (4.12)
for all valid error patterns e.
Problem Error Correcting Data Exchange (ECDE) is defined as follows.
Problem ECDE. For given k, n, {Si} and a, find the encoding matrix Γ = [γi,j]
and time slot assignment t1, . . . , tµ that satisfy the following conditions:
1. γi,j = 0 for all i and j such that j /∈ Sti;
2. Each client i can correctly decode all packets in the presence of at most a faulty
clients, i.e., Xˆ i = X;
3. There does not exist another solution with µ′ < µ transmissions that satisfies
conditions (1) and (2).
A a solution that satisfies conditions (1) and (2) is referred to as a feasible ECDE
solution. A solution that satisfies all three conditions is referred to as an optimal
ECDE solution.
4.2.2 Relationship with ErCDE Problem
It turns out that the ECDE problem is closely related to the ErCDE problem.
We demonstrate their relationship with the following two theorems.
Theorem 9. There exists a solution to an instance of Problem ECDE if and only if
for any packet Xm ∈ X, there exist at least 2a + 1 distinct clients j1, . . . , j2a+1 such
that Xm ∈ Sji for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 2a+ 1}.
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Proof. Suppose that for some Xm ∈ X the condition does not hold. We consider
an instance of Problem ECDE in which a packet Xm is held by at most 2a distinct
clients. Suppose, by the way of contradiction, that there exists a feasible solution
Γ = [γi,j] for this instance.
Let Cˆ be a subset of clients in C that include packet Xm in their side information.
Suppose that min{|Cˆ|, a} of the copies of Xm held by Cˆ are faulty and consider the
decoder of a non-faulty client ` that does not have Xm as side information. We show
that both vectors X and X¯ =
[
X1 · · · Xm−1 X¯m Xm+1 · · · Xn
]T
result in a
valid error pattern with respect to (4.12), hence, client ` would not be able to decide
whether X or X¯ is the correct set of packets.
First, we note that all non-zero entries in the error pattern
e =
P
S`
−
 Γ
U `
X,
correspond to transmissions of faulty clients. Since the number of such clients is
limited by a, e is a valid error pattern.
Next, consider the error pattern
e¯ =
P
S`
−
 Γ
U `
 X¯.
For this pattern, the non-zero entries correspond to transmissions of clients in Cˆ that
have the correct value of Xm. Since the number of such clients is at most a, e¯ is also
a valid error pattern.
For the converse statement, if the condition is satisfied, we can construct a trans-
mission scheme such that all non-faulty clients can decode X correctly. In this
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scheme, each packet Xi ∈ X is transmitted by 2a + 1 different clients without cod-
ing. The decoders of non-faulty clients can decode by selecting the value of majority
of each packet.
Before we proceed, we need to introduce additional notations. Let Ψ be a subset
of [k]. We denote by Ψ¯ = [k] \ Ψ. We also denote by ΓΨ as the submatrix of Γ
formed by the rows indexed by {i : ti ∈ Ψ} and by PΨ be the vector of elements in
P indexed by the same subset.
The following theorem shows that a transmission scheme is a feasible solution to
Problem ECDE if and only if any client ` can decode all packets it needs from the
transmissions made by any k − 2|A|−1 other non-faulty clients in [k] \ {`}.
Theorem 10. A transmission scheme Γ is a feasible solution for an instance of
Problem ECDE if and only if for any client ` and any subset Ψ ⊂ [k] \ {`} of size
|Ψ|= 2a, it holds that
rank
ΓΨ¯
U `
 = n. (4.13)
Proof. We first show that this condition is necessary. Suppose that (4.13) is not
satisfied for some client ` ∈ [k] and Ψ = {j1, . . . , j2a}.
Consider the case where A = {j1, . . . , ja} is the set of faulty clients. Clearly,
Xˆ = X is a solution to (4.12) with a valid error pattern e. We show that there
exists another solution to (4.12) which also has a valid error pattern.
We proceed by considering the following equation:
ΓΨ¯
U `
 Xˆ =
P Ψ¯
S`
 . (4.14)
Since all of the transmissions in P Ψ¯ are made by non-faulty clients, Xˆ = X
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satisfies (4.14). However, since matrix
ΓΨ¯
U `
 has rank less than n, there exists a
different solution Xˆ = X¯ to (4.14), i.e., X¯ 6= X.
Now, suppose that the faulty clients in A make the following transmissions: Pi =
γiX¯ for each ti ∈ A. This implies that X¯ is a solution for equation (4.12) with
a valid error pattern. Indeed, the nonzero entries in e can only be indexed by the
subset {i : ti ∈ Ψ \ A}. Since |Ψ \ A|= a, then by (4.11), e is a valid error pattern
and X¯ is a solution to (4.12). Therefore (4.12) has at least two solutions with valid
error patterns, hence Γ is not a feasible solution.
We proceed to prove the sufficiency condition by presenting a decoding algorithm
that allows a client ` ∈ [k] to correctly decode all packets in X provided that the
condition (4.13) is satisfied. The decoding algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 5 Algorithm Decode
1: for each Φ ⊂ [k] of size |Φ|= a do
2: if there exists Xˆ that satisfies[
ΓΦ¯
U `
]
Xˆ =
[
P Φ¯
S`
]
.
then
3: return Xˆ
4: end if
5: end for
The decoding process is performed in rounds. In each round, the decoder excludes
transmissions from a clients indexed by Φ and attempts to find Xˆ that satisfies the
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constraints imposed by other transmissions:
ΓΦ¯
U `
 Xˆ =
P Φ¯
S`
 . (4.15)
Note that such a solution Xˆ exists for Φ = A, so the algorithm will never fail.
We then show that if a solution Xˆ to (4.15) exists, then it is a unique solution that
satisfies Xˆ = X. Let Ψ be a set formed by the union of Φ and A and indices of
possibly other clients, such that |Ψ|= 2a. Since
ΓΨ¯
U `
 is a full rank matrix, there
exists a unique solution Xˆ = X to (4.14), which in turn implies a unique solution
to (4.15).
It follows directly from Theorem 10 that ECDE problem is a special case of
ErCDE problem. In particular, if the number of adversarial clients in an instance of
ECDE problem is g, then it is equivalent to an instance of ErCDE problem where
the number of faulty clients is 2g. Since we only proved that the ErCDE problem
is unreliable for the case of g = 1, it is necessary to prove NP-hardness of ErCDE
problem for the case of g = 2 in order to show the NP-hardness of ECDE problem.
However, since the proof is very similar to each other, we will not show the complete
proof here and will only show the sketch of the reduction and the conclusions.
Given an instance G(V,E) of the Vertex Cover problem we construct an instance
of Problem ECDE with k = l + 3m+ 1 clients C and n = 2m packets X as follows:
• For each edge ei ∈ E there are two packets in X, denoted by ei and e′i;
• For each vertex vi ∈ V , there is a corresponding client vi in C whose side
information includes packets {ei1 , . . . , eid(vi)}, such that each packet eij in the
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Figure 4.3: Reduction from the Vertex Cover problem to Problem ECDE.
side information of vi corresponds to an edge in E incident to vi. Here, d(vi)
is the degree of client vi;
• For each edge ei ∈ E, there are two clients e1i and e2i whose side information
includes packets ei and e
′
i;
• For each edge ei ∈ E, there is a client e3i whose side information includes packet
e′i only;
• There is one special client c that has empty side information.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the reduction process. Suppose that that the minimum
vertex cover to the graph G(V,E) has size η. The following lemmas and theorem
from [53] concludes the NP-hardness of ECDE problem. We omit the detailed proof
here.
Lemma 20 ( [53]). The number of transmissions in an optimum ECDE solution µ
satisfies
µ ≤ 3|E|+η.
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Lemma 21 ( [53]). The number of transmissions in an optimum ECDE solution µ
satisfies
µ ≥ 3|E|+η.
Theorem 11 ( [53]). The ECDE problem is NP-Hard.
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5. COOPERATIVE DATA EXCHANGE WITH DEADLINE
Previous studies on this problem typically consider a setting in which all clients
are present for the duration of data exchange. However, in many practical settings,
the clients might have to leave the system before the information exchange is com-
plete. In some common settings, the leaving time is known or can be accurately
predicted. For example, in vehicular networks, information exchange occur when a
certain number of cars are in the physical proximity hence the time that the cars
leave the system can be predicted based on the current velocity and location. Ac-
cordingly, in this paper, we investigate settings in which each client is associated
with the deadline imposted by the need leave the system.
The presence of deadline introduces another interesting dimension to the problem.
In particular, it becomes important to prioritize the transmissions so the clients that
have tight deadlines will be able to decode the packets they need. In addition, each
client in the system can be potentially a sender and there is a need to make sure that
the senders are prioritized and are able to make transmissions before the deadline.
In our study, we define two problem models of cooperative data exchange with
deadline. In the first model, we want to maximize the total number of clients that
receive the complete set of packets before their deadline. In the second model, the
goal is to maximize the total amount of new knowledge learned by the clients before
they depart.
Our problem models are motivated by the application in vehicular network sys-
tems. In such systems, usually some common information (e.g. whether around the
area) is required to be distributed to all clients in the network. The clients (vehicles)
move in an area and create CDE networks with other clients in vicinity to exchange
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the information. According to client mobility, some clients will depart from a net-
work at certain time, and possibly join another CDE network later. Some clients
may need to enter a number of CDE networks to receive all the packets. Therefore,
a natural strategy in each CDE network is to maximize amount of new knowledge
learned by the clients.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1. We prove that both problems we define are NP-hard problem.
2. For the second problem model, we establish an approximation algorithm whose
approximation ratio is upper bounded by 2.
Related work. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work consider-
ing the client deadline in CDE problem. A similar problem is the realtime broadcast
problem, where a base station broadcasts to receivers some packets that expire af-
ter a deadline. Work by Tran et al. [54] and Wang et al. [55] establish models and
algorithms for this problem. Another work by Li et al. [56] analyzes the through-
put and delay performance of different coding strategy in this problem. A recent
work [57] considers CDE problem with packet deadlines. Comparing to the problem
we consider, reference [57] considers deadlines on packets instead of clients. The per-
formance metrics is the total number of packets received by all the clients before the
deadline. The authors prove the complexity of the problem and established heuristic
algorithm for the problem proposed.
5.1 Problem Model
Our problem is based on a network instance for the CDE problem. The network
includes a set of k wireless clients, C = {ci|i ∈ [k]} and a set of n packets X =
{xi, i ∈ [n]}, where [i] denotes the set {1, · · · , i}. We assume that the packets in X
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are randomly and uniformly distributed over the underlying finite field Fq of size q.
Initially, each client in C has access to a subset of packets Si ⊆ X. We refer to Si as
the side information set of client ci. For clarity of presentation, we assume that each
packet belongs to the side information set of at least one client. The goal of the clients
is to exchange data such that each one of them will be able to obtain all packets in
X. To this end, the clients use a lossless channel which allows a client to broadcast
data to all other clients in C. We use the term message to refer to the symbols
transmitted in the broadcast channel, in contrast to packet that refers to the original
uncoded packets x1, . . . , xn that clients have as side information. The broadcast is
performed in rounds. In round i one of the clients, indexed by ti, broadcasts message
pi which is a linear combination of packets that belong to its side information set
Sti . More specifically,
pi =
∑
j:xj∈Sti
γijxj, (5.1)
where γij is the coefficient of packet xj in message pi. For convenience we set γij = 0
for all j ∈ {j, xj /∈ Sti}. Note that the message pi transmitted in round i can be
characterized by a vector γi =
[
γi1 γi2 . . . γin
]
. We refer to vector γi as the
encoding vector of message pi. We denote by P the set of all messages transmitted,
i.e.
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pµ},
where µ is the total number of transmission rounds. We also construct the encoding
matrix Γ that includes vectors γ1, γ2, . . . , γµ as rows, i.e. Γ =
[
γT1 γ
T
2 . . . γ
T
µ
]T
.
We refer to the encoding matrix Γ and the schedule of transmitters {ti} as the
encoding scheme.
In our model, we assume that each client is associated with a deadline, which is
the index of a round. The deadline of client ci is denoted as di. After dith round,
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client ci can no longer receive or transmit packets over the broadcast channel.
Definition 8. A client ci is satisfied if, after round di, client ci can recover all packets
X from its side information and messages received from the broadcast channel.
Before we define our problem, we establish the definition of knowledge of a client.
Definition 9. The knowledge Gij of a client ci at round j is defined as
Gij = dim(Si ∪ {p1, . . . , pj}),
where j ≤ di.
The notation G reflects how much information clients ci has on the packet set
X. For convenience of notation, we define Gij = Gidi for any j > di. Note that the
knowledge of a client is upper bounded by n.
Definition 10. The difference Gij −Gij′ of knowledge of client i at round j and j′ is
referred as the gain of knowledge of client ci between round j and round j
′. We refer
to the summation of gain of knowledge of all clients after the data exchange process,
∑
i∈[k]
Giµ,
as the total gain of knowledge of the clients.
We define our problems as follows.
Definition 11. Problem DED-SAT For a network instance k, n, {Si}, {di}, de-
termine the maximum number of clients that can be satisfied by an encoding scheme.
Definition 12. Problem DED-GAIN For a network instance k, n, {Si}, {di}, de-
termine the maximum total gain of knowledge that can be achieved by an encoding
scheme.
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5.2 Problem Hardness
In this section, we prove that both problems DED-SAT and DED-GAIN are NP-
hard. In particular, we prove that a special decision version of problem DED-SAT is
an NP-Complete problem. This problem can be described as follows:
Definition 13. Problem DED-SAT-d For a network instance k, n, {Si}, {di}, de-
termine if there exists an encoding scheme that satisfies all k clients.
The proof of DED-SAT-d being in NP is straightforward. Provided with an
encoding scheme, we can easily determine whether all clients are satisfied.
We start the proof of NP-hardness with a polynomial time reduction from the
Vertex Cover decision problem.
Vertex Cover problem: For a graph G(V,E), determine if there exists a subset
S ⊆ V of vertices of size no greater than η such that any edge e ∈ E is incident to
at least one vertex in S.
We denote an instance of Vertex Cover problem as V C(G, η). Let V = {v1, . . . , vl}
and E = {e1, . . . , em}. For one of such instance, we construct reduction to a DED−
SAT − d problem with the following inputs:
1. For each edge ei ∈ E, create one corresponding packet in X denoted by xi.
2. Create η − 1 packets denoted by y1, . . . , yη−1;
3. For each edge ei ∈ E, create one client denoted by cei whose side information
is Sei = {x1, . . . , xm} \ {xi}; its deadline is dei = η. For each vertex vi ∈ V ,
create one client denoted by cvi whose side information is S
v
i = {xj : ej ∈
N(vi)}∪{y1, . . . , yη−1}, where N(vi) is the set of edges incident with vertex vi;
its deadline is dvi = M where M >> n is a very large number.
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Lemma 22. There exists an encoding scheme to the reduction that satisfies all k
clients if and only if the answer to V C(G,m) is true.
Proof. We first provide some observations of the reduction. Note that dei = η =
n − |Sei |. Therefore for any i ∈ |E|, client cei cannot make any transmission in a
feasible solution. Otherwise, it will not be able to receive enough messages from
other clients to decode all the packets X. In addition, since the deadline dvi for a
client cvi is very large, these clients can be satisfied if the set of clients {cvi } hold all
the packets X as side information. This condition holds naturally by the way we
construct the network.
We prove the converse statement first. Assume the answer to V C(G, η) is yes.
We denote the optimal vertex cover by Vˆ = {v`1 , . . . , v`|Vˆ | ⊂ V , where |Vˆ |≤ η. We
construct a feasible solution to the reduction with the following steps:
1. For each i ∈ [|Vˆ |], client cv`i broadcasts one message;
2. For each i > |Vˆ |, find an arbitrary client from {cvj} which broadcasts one
message.
The coefficients of the packets in each message are assigned a nonzero value from the
underlying field Fq randomly with a uniform distribution.
We claim that the resulting encoding scheme satisfies all clients in the reduction
network with high probability. For a client cei to decode the packets it needs, it first
cancels monomials corresponding to its side information in each of the messages.
Since Vˆ is a vertex cover to G, for each packet xi, at least one message contains a
nonzero term of xi. Therefore, after this step, client c
e
i solves the values of unknown
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packets by solving an equation set of η variables and η equations:
[
A B
]

xi
y1
...
yη−1

=

p1
p2
...
pη

. (5.2)
In (5.2), A ∈ Fη×1q is a nonzero random vector and B ∈ Fη×(η−1)q is a random matrix.
According to [45], with high probability matrix
[
A B
]
is full rank, thus cei can
decode all the packets with high probability.
Concluding above statements, there exists at least one encoding scheme that
satisfies all the clients {cei}. According to our previous observation, clients {cvi } can
always decode all packets. Therefore the converse statement holds.
Now we prove the forward statement by contrapositive. Assume the answer to
V C(G, η) is no, i.e. there does not exist any vertex cover of size less than η. Then
correspondingly for any selection of η clients from cv1, . . . , c
v
n, at least one packet
xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xm} is not known by these η clients. Therefore at least one client cei
which requires packet xi will not receive any information on the packet xi. So in this
case an encoding scheme that satisfies all the clients does not exist.
The following theorem follows naturally from the above lemma.
Theorem 12. DED-SAT-d is an NP-Complete problem.
In addition, the following corollaries hold.
Corollary 1. DED-SAT and DED-GAIN are NP-hard problems.
Proof. Any algorithm that solves DED-SAT in polynomial time can solve DED-SAT-
d by checking whether the maximum number of clients that can be satisfied equals the
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total number of clients k. Similarly, any algorithm that solves DED-GAIN can solve
DED-SAT-d by checking whether the maximum gain of knowledge equals
∑
i∈[k].
5.3 Approximation Algorithm
In this section, we propose an approximation algorithm that guarantees perfor-
mance bound of constant factor for problem DED-GAIN.
Our algorithm for the optimization version problem is described as follows. The
algorithm runs by iteration. In each iteration, we find the client that achieves max-
imum gain of knowledge within this round. That is, we choose client ti to transmit
in the i’th time slot where
i = arg max
i
∑
j∈[k]
Gji −Gj(i−1).
The same strategy is conducted repeatedly in each iteration until time slot di or until
no transmission can provide additional information to other clients in the system.
We claim the following performance of our algorithm.
Theorem 13. The approximation ratio of our algorithm is upper bounded by 2.
To start the proof, we first make several definitions. We define a state of the
network at a time slot as the knowledge of all the clients in the network at the end of
this time slot, including their initial side information and the linear combinations of
packets received from the broadcast network. The state of the network at time slot
i is denoted as Ii. The initial state of the network is denoted as I0. We use OPTi to
denote the maximum gain of knowledge achievable after time slot Ii, i.e.
OPTi = max
γi+1,...,γλi
∑
j∈[k]
(Gjλi − Gji),
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where λi is the total number of transmissions in the solution corresponding to OPTi.
Denote the corresponding scheme as P∗i . We denote the client we select to transmit
in time slot i as ti and the gain we obtain from this transmission as bi.
We start analysis from one of the intermediate network state Ii−1. Starting from
round i, there must exists an optimal solution γ∗i , . . . , γ
∗
λi
to obtain gain of knowledge
of OPTi−1. We denote the client that makes the transmission in time slot i in this
optimal solution as client t∗i . Denote the gain of knowledge of this optimal solution in
time slot i as b∗i . In our algorithm, we choose the client ti which obtain the optimal
one-round gain of knowledge. Therefore bi ≥ b∗i .
We claim that OPTi ≥ OPTi−1− bi− b∗i . Such a scheme is obtained by replacing
ct∗i with ci to send message in round i. If we remove the transmission of round i from
P∗i , at most bi total knowledge is lost. In addition, the knowledge provided by client
cti in the new scheme may not contain any new information from the messages in
rounds i + 1, . . . , λi−1. Therefore, in the worst case, the same messages in rounds
i+1, . . . , λi−1 as in P∗i will provide at least OPTi−1− bi− b∗i gain of knowledge. Note
that since bi ≥ b∗i , it holds that
OPTi ≥ OPTi−1 − 2bi. (5.3)
Now we prove the theorem above.
Proof. Denote gi as the gain of knowledge that our algorithm obtains after round i.
We use induction to prove that gi ≥ OPTi2 for all i = 0, . . . , µ, where µ is the total
number of rounds our algorithm uses. The boundary condition gµ ≥ OPTµ2 must be
satisfied because OPTµ = 0.
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Suppose gi ≥ OPTi2 is true for some i such that 0 < i ≤ µ, then
gi−1 = gi + bi (5.4)
≥ OPTi
2
+ bi (5.5)
≥ OPTi−1 − 2bi
2
+ bi (5.6)
=
OPTi−1
2
.
Equation (5.4) is from definition of gi. Inequality (5.5) holds from the induction
condition. Inequality (5.6) holds from (5.3).
Based on the proof above, we conclude that g0 ≥ OPT02 . It is equivalent to∑
i∈[k] Giµ ≥ OPT2 , where OPT is the optimum total gain of knowledge we can achieve
for the given network. This concludes the proof.
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6. COOPERATIVE DATA EXCHANGE WITH PRIORITY CLIENTS∗
The problem of Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE) [58] models a Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) wireless data exchange scenario among a group of clients within a local-area
network. Initially, each client has a subset of packets of the ground set X of size
K. The clients want to exchange all their packets via broadcasting (possibly coded
versions of) their packets over a shared lossless channel. The objective of the CDE
problem is to find the minimum total number of transmissions so as to satisfy all
clients such that each client achieves universal recovery (i.e., it recovers the whole
set of packets in X).
In this work, we consider an extension of the CDE problem, referred to as the
cooperative data exchange with priority (CDEP). In the CDEP problem, the clients
are divided into different priority classes. The objective of this problem is: (i) to
satisfy all clients with high priority in the first round of transmissions, with minimum
number of transmissions, and (ii) to satisfy all clients with low priority in the second
round of transmissions, with minimum number of transmissions.
This problem is motivated by several practical scenarios. For example, when mul-
tiple mobile users in a local-area wireless network are streaming video from the same
source and the cellular connection within this area is lossy, the clients may use P2P
and coding techniques to exchange packets using short-range wireless technologies
such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. The video provider can have control over the priority
of the clients (e.g., via controlling the data exchange protocol with vendor-provided
application) to guarantee that paid users have higher streaming speed over the other
∗Parts of this section are reprinted, with permission, from Anoosheh Heidarzadeh, Muxi Yan
and Alex Sprintson, “Cooperative Data Exchange with Priority Classes,” to appear in 2016 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Jul. 2016, c© 2016 IEEE.
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clients.
Related work. The problem of CDE was originally proposed in [58] for a broad-
cast network, and was later generalized for arbitrary networks in [35,59–61]. Several
(randomized and deterministic) solutions were proposed in [31,32,62], and lower and
upper bounds on the minimum number of transmissions were established in [63].
Multiple extensions of CDE were later studied in [36,37,46,53,64–67]. In particular,
references [36,37] focused on scenarios with various transmission costs. Scenarios pro-
viding secrecy and weak security were considered in [64,65], and [46,66], respectively,
and references [53,67,68] studied the problem of CDE with error/erasure correction.
Lately, Chan et al. in [69] introduced a new generalization of CDE, referred
to as the successive omniscience (SO), which is perhaps the closest to CDEP in
framework. In SO, one (or multiple) given subset(s) of clients, referred to as local
groups, achieve maximal recovery first, i.e., within each local group the clients learn
(from each other) the set of all packets they collectively hold (local omniscience).
Then, the universal recovery is achieved within all the clients (global omniscience).
The setting considered in the current work, however, is different from the setting
in [69] since the clients with low priority also participate in helping the clients with
high priority to achieve universal recovery first.
Our contribution in this work is presenting a linear programming approach to
find the minimum number of transmissions in each round for any instance of the
problem. Moreover, it was shown in [35] (for the CDE problem), and more recently
in [67] and [68] (for the CDE problem with erasure/error correction), that a solution
can be characterized in closed-form for the case in which the packets are randomly
distributed among clients. Motivated by this, we further investigate the possibility
of establishing such results for the CDEP problem, and for any random instance of
the problem following the random packet distribution model, derive a closed-form
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expression (which holds with probability approaching 1 as K tends to infinity) for
the minimum number of transmissions in each round.
6.1 Problem Model
Consider N clients and the set X of K packets x1, x2, . . . , xK . For any integer n,
we denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n]. We assume that each client i ∈ [N ] holds a subset
of the packets in the set X, denoted by Xi, and wishes to achieve universal recovery,
i.e., to recover all the rest of the packets in the set X, denoted by X i = X \ Xi.
Without loss of generality, we assume X = ∪1≤i≤NXi.
In the original setting of CDE, the problem is to find a transmission schedule {ri}
and a coding scheme with each client i transmitting ri coded packets such that all
clients achieve universal recovery with minimum total number of transmissions
∑
i ri.
In this work, we consider a generalization of this problem, for the settings where the
clients are divided into two different priority classes: clients with high priority and
clients with low priority. (This model can be extended to cases with more than two
levels of priority, yet this is beyond the scope of this paper.) We assume, without loss
of generality, that for any given 0 < M < N , the clients 1, . . . ,M have high priority
and the rest of the clients have low priority. The transmissions are divided into two
rounds accordingly: (i) by the end of the first round of transmissions the clients with
high priority must be able to recover all their missing packets, and (ii) by the end
of the second round of transmissions, the clients with low priority must be able to
recover all their missing packets. The goal is to achieve (i) and (ii) successively, each
with minimum number of transmissions. We refer to this problem as the CDE with
priority (CDEP).
Let r
(1)
i and r
(2)
i denote the number of transmissions by each client i in the first
and the second round, respectively. We assume that each packet xi is Q-divisible for
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an arbitrary integer Q (i.e., xi can be partitioned into Q chunks of equal size). Thus,
the transmissions can consist of a single chunk (as opposed to an entire packet), and
r
(1)
i and r
(2)
i can be rational numbers (not necessarily integer).
We say that a transmission schedule {r(1)i , r(2)i } is a (feasible and optimal) solution
to the CDEP problem so long as: (i) (feasibility) there exists a coding scheme with
each client i transmitting r
(1)
i and r
(2)
i coded packets in the first and the second
round, respectively, such that the clients with high or low priority achieve universal
recovery by the end of the first or the second round, respectively; and (ii) (optimality)∑
i r
(1)
i and
∑
i r
(2)
i are minimum. Our goal is to find a solution for any given problem
instance {Xi}. (We notice that the CDEP problem can be reduced to a multicast
problem, and thus, the universal recovery is achievable (with high probability) by
employing random linear network coding (over a sufficiently large finite field) so long
as {r(1)i , r(2)i } is a solution.)
6.2 Arbitrary Problem Instances
Theorem 14 gives a linear programming-based solution to arbitrary instances of
the problem.
Theorem 14. For any arbitrary {Xi}, a solution to the CDEP problem is given by
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the following linear program (LP):
min.
∑
i∈[N ]
r
(2)
i (6.1)
s.t.
∑
i∈[N ]
r
(1)
i = r
∗ (6.2)
∑
i∈N
r
(1)
i ≥
∣∣∣∣⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣,∀N ⊂ [N ],[M ] 6⊂N (6.3)∑
i∈N
r
(1)
i + r
(2)
i ≥
∣∣∣∣⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣,∀N ⊂ [N ],[M ]⊂N (6.4)
(r
(1)
i , r
(2)
i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [N ])
where r∗ is the optimal value of the following LP:
min.
∑
i∈[N ]
ri (6.5)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
ri ≥
∣∣∣∣⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣,∀N ⊂ [N ],[M ] 6⊂N (6.6)
(ri ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [N ])
Proof (Sketch). As was previously shown in [35], the CDE problem can be reduced
to a multicast (network coding) problem. Using similar techniques, we can reduce
the CDEP problem to a multicast problem as well. As a result, the cut-set bounds
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving universal recovery by the
clients with high or low priority in the first or the second round, respectively.
We notice that in CDE the cut-set bounds indicate that the (total) number of
transmissions by any subset of clients cannot be less than the number of packets
that the rest of the clients are all missing. In CDEP, the scenario is slightly different
since there is a distinction between the clients (according to their level of priority,
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and consequently, the transmission round they need to achieve universal recovery),
and thus not all the cut-set bounds are necessary in each round. In the following,
we specify the cut-set interpretation of the constraints in LP (6.1).
In the first round, only the clients with priority need to achieve universal recovery.
Thus, in this round, for any subset of clients N containing all clients with high
priority (i.e., [M ] ⊂ N ), the corresponding cut-set bound ∑i∈N r(1)i ≥ |∩i/∈NX i| is
not necessary. This is due to the fact that for any such a subset of clients, the rest
of the clients ([N ] \N ) have low priority, and need not to achieve universal recovery.
For any other subset of clients N not containing all clients with high priority (i.e.,
[M ] 6⊂ N ), the necessity of the corresponding cut-set bound is however obvious. This
yields the constraints in (6.3).
When the first round ends, all clients with high priority achieve universal recovery,
and become equivalent to one super-client with no missing packet. Thus, in the
second round, the CDEP problem reduces to a CDE problem where the set of clients
consists of all clients with low priority and the super-client. For any subset of clients
N not containing the super-client (i.e., [M ] 6⊂ N ), there exists no packet that the
rest of the clients are all missing since the super-client has all the packets (i.e.,
|∩i/∈NX i|= 0), and thus, in this round, the corresponding cut-set bound
∑
i∈N r
(1)
i +
r
(2)
i ≥ |∩i/∈NX i| does not impose a necessary constraint. The rest of the cut-set
bounds, however, are all necessary and yield the constraints in (6.4).
The constraint (6.2) is obvious since the clients with high priority require to
achieve universal recovery with minimum number of transmissions. Also, minimizing
the total number of transmissions in both rounds (i.e.,
∑
i∈[N ] r
(1)
i + r
(2)
i ), subject
to (6.2), translates into minimizing the number of transmissions in the second round
(i.e.,
∑
i∈[N ] r
(2)
i ), and subsequently, the clients with low priority achieve universal
recovery with minimum number of transmissions as required.
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6.3 Random Packet Distribution
Assume that each packet is available at each client, independently from other
packets and clients, with probability (w.p.) p, for some 0 < p < 1. The result of
Theorem 15 shows that, under this assumption, referred to as the random packet dis-
tribution in [35], for any random instance of the problem we can further characterize
a solution to LP (6.1) in closed-form (w.p. approaching 1 as K →∞).
Assume that the clients are re-labeled such that
SM∗ ≥ SM, ∀M ⊂ [M ], |M|= M − 1, (6.7)
where M∗ = [M − 1] and
SM =
1
|M|
(∑
i∈M
∣∣X i∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈M
X i
∣∣∣∣
)
. (6.8)
Theorem 15. For any {Xi} being chosen randomly according to the random packet
distribution, a solution to the CDEP problem is given by
r˜
(1)
i =

1
M − 1 (Y1 + Y )− |X i|, 1 ≤ i ≤M
1
N −M (Y2 − Y )− |X i|, M < i ≤ N
(6.9)
and
r˜
(2)
i =

(M − 1)Y2−(N −M)Y1−(N − 1)Y
M(M − 1)(N −M) , 1 ≤ i ≤M
0, M < i ≤ N
(6.10)
w.p. approaching 1 as K → ∞, where Y1 =
∑
1≤i<M |X i|, Y2 =
∑
M≤i≤N |X i|, and
Y = |∩M≤i≤NX i|.
Proof. In Theorems 16 and 17, we respectively prove the feasibility and optimality
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(w.p. approaching 1 as K →∞) of {r˜(1)i , r˜(2)i } defined in (6.9) and (6.10) with respect
to (w.r.t.) LP (6.1) for any randomly chosen instance of the problem (according to
the random packet distribution).
The following concentration result is useful in the proofs, and follows from the
random packet distribution assumption (by the law of large numbers).
Lemma 23. [67, Lemma 5] For any N ⊂ [N ], |N |= V (0 < V < N), and any
 > 0, w.p. approaching 1 as K →∞,
∣∣∣∣∣ 1K
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣− ZV
∣∣∣∣∣ < ,
where
ZV =
(1− p)N−V − (1− p)N
1− (1− p)N .
The following two lemmas are also crucial in the proof of our results. The proofs
are given in Appendix.
Lemma 24. For any 0 < p < 1 and 0 < V1 < V2 < N ,
ZV1
V1
<
ZV2
V2
.
Lemma 25. For any 0 < p < 1 and 0 < V1 < V < V2 < N ,
V2 − V
V2 − V1ZV1 +
V − V1
V2 − V1ZV2 > ZV .
The following results hold “w.p. approaching 1 as K → ∞,” and hence, for
brevity, we often omit this statement.
Theorem 16. {r˜(1)i , r˜(2)i } is feasible w.r.t. LP (6.1).
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Proof. The proof consists of two parts: (i) the feasibility of {r˜(1)i } w.r.t. (6.2) and (6.3)
(Lemmas 26 and 27), and (ii) the feasibility of {r˜(1)i , r˜(2)i } w.r.t. (6.4) (Lemma 28).
The feasibility of {r˜(1)i } w.r.t. (6.2) and (6.3) is equivalent to {r˜(1)i } being a so-
lution to LP (6.5). Lemmas 26 and 27 prove the feasibility and optimality of {r˜(1)i }
w.r.t. LP (6.5), respectively.
Lemma 26. {r˜(1)i } is feasible w.r.t. LP (6.5).
Proof. We first prove that SM∗ ≥ SM, for any M⊂ [M ], where M∗ = [M − 1] and
SM =
1
|M|
(∑
i∈M
∣∣X i∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈M
X i
∣∣∣∣
)
.
By (6.7), the case of M with |M|= M − 1 is obvious. Take an arbitrary M such
that |M|< M − 1. By Lemma 23,
SM∗
K
≥ ZN−1 + ZM−1
M − 1 − ,
and
SM
K
≤ ZN−1 + Z|M||M| + ,
for any  > 0. Also, by Lemma 24,
ZM−1
M − 1 >
Z|M|
|M| ,
for any |M|< M − 1, and thus SM∗ ≥ SM.
We now show that (6.6) holds for any N ⊂ [N ] such that [M ] 6⊂ N . Take an
arbitrary N , and partition it into two partsM = N ∩ [M ] (obviously |M|< M) and
Mˆ = N \M. We consider two cases: (i) |Mˆ|= 0, and (ii) |Mˆ|6= 0.
104
In case (i), there are two possibilities: M = M∗ or M 6= M∗. For M = M∗,
both sides of (6.6) are equal to Y . Also, for M 6= M∗, the LHS and RHS of (6.6)
are equal to |M|
M−1(Y1 +Y )−
∑
i∈M|X i| and |∩i/∈MX i|, respectively. Thus, (6.6) holds
so long as
1
M − 1(Y1 + Y ) ≥
1
|M|
(∑
i∈M
∣∣X i∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈M
X i
∣∣∣∣
)
. (6.11)
By definition, the LHS and RHS of (6.11) are SM∗ and SM, respectively. As shown
earlier, SM∗ ≥ SM, and thus (6.6) holds.
In case (ii), we also consider two possibilities: 0 < |N |< M or M ≤ |N |< N .
For 0 < |N |< M , the proof consists of two parts: (ii-1) (6.6) holds for any N ⊂ [N ]
such that [M ] 6⊂ N so long as it holds for anyM′ ⊂ [M ], |M′|= |N |, and (ii-2) (6.6)
holds for any M′ ⊂ [M ], 0 < |M′|< M . To prove (ii-1), it suffices to show that
∑
i∈N
r˜
(1)
i −
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∑
i∈M′
r˜
(1)
i −
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈M′
X i
∣∣∣∣. (6.12)
By substituting {r(1)i } into (6.12), we get
|Mˆ|
N −M (Y2 − Y )−
|Mˆ|
M − 1(Y1 + Y )
≥
∑
i∈N\M′
∣∣X i∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈M′
X i
∣∣∣∣. (6.13)
By dividing both sides by K and applying Lemma 23, it follows that (6.13) holds
so long as ZN−1
N−1 >
ZM−1
M−1 , and by Lemma 24, this obviously holds since M < N . To
prove (ii-2), it is sufficient to prove that
∑
i∈M′ r˜
(1)
i ≥ |∩i/∈M′X i|. This holds so long
as
1
M − 1(Y1 + Y ) ≥
1
|M′|
(∑
i∈M′
∣∣X i∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈M′
X i
∣∣∣∣
)
, (6.14)
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or equivalently, SM∗ ≥ SM′ , which was proven earlier.
Also, for M ≤ |N |< N , the proof consists of two parts: (ii-3) (6.6) holds for any
N ⊂ [N ] such that [M ] 6⊂ N so long as it holds for any N ′ ⊂ [N ], |N ′|= |N | such
that |M′|= M − 1, and (ii-4) (6.6) holds for any N ⊂ [N ], M ≤ |N |< N such that
|M|= M − 1. To prove (ii-3), one needs to show that
∑
i∈N
r˜
(1)
i −
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣ ≥∑
i∈N ′
r˜
(1)
i −
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N ′
X i
∣∣∣∣, (6.15)
or equivalently,
M − |M|−1
N −M (Y2 − Y )−
M − |M|−1
M − 1 (Y1 + Y )
≥
∑
i∈N
∣∣X i∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣−∑
i∈N ′
∣∣X i∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N ′
X i
∣∣∣∣. (6.16)
By Lemma 23, (6.16) holds so long as ZN−1
N−1 >
ZM−1
M−1 , which was previously shown to
be true (by taking V1 = M − 1 and V2 = N − 1 in Lemma 24). To prove (ii-4), it
suffices to show
∑
i∈N r˜
(1)
i ≥ |∩i/∈NX i|, or equivalently,
(Y1 + Y ) +
|N |−M + 1
N −M (Y2 − Y ) ≥
∑
i∈N
∣∣X i∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣. (6.17)
By dividing both sides by K and applying Lemma 23, it follows that (6.17) holds so
long as
N − |N |−1
N −M ZM−1 +
|N |−M + 1
N −M ZN−1 > Z|N |. (6.18)
Taking V1 = M − 1, V = |N | and V2 = N − 1, Lemma 25 yields (6.18) since
M ≤ |N |< N .
Lemma 27. {r˜(1)i } is optimal w.r.t. LP (6.5).
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Proof. The dual of LP (6.5) is given by
max.
∑
N⊂[N ]:
[M ]6⊂N
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣sN (6.19)
s.t.
∑
N⊂[N ]
sN1{i∈N} ≤ 1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.20)
(sN ≥ 0,∀N ⊂ [N ]).
We prove that the duality gap with regards to LP (6.5) and LP (6.19) is zero. Take
s˜[M−1] = 1M−1 and s˜[N ]\{1} = · · · = s˜[N ]\{M−1} = 1M−1 , and s˜N = 0 for any other N .
It is straightforward that {s˜N} meets (6.20), and thus it is feasible w.r.t. LP (6.19).
It is easy to see that
∑
N⊂[N ]:
[M ] 6⊂N
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣s˜N = 1M − 1(Y1 + Y ).
Also, we have ∑
i∈[N ]
r˜
(1)
i =
1
M − 1(Y1 + Y ).
Thus, by the duality principle, {r˜(1)i } and {s˜N} are optimal w.r.t. LP (6.5) and
LP (6.19), respectively, and the optimal value is equal to 1
M−1(Y1 + Y ).
Lemma 28. {r˜(1)i , r˜(2)i } is feasible w.r.t. (6.4).
Proof. We need to show
∑
i∈N r˜
(1)
i + r˜
(2)
i ≥ |∩i/∈NX i| for any N ⊂ [N ] such that
[M ] ⊂ N . Take an arbitrary N , and let Mˆ = N \ [M ]. By substituting {r˜(1)i } and
{r˜(2)i }, the latter inequality becomes
(6.21)
(
|Mˆ|+1
N −M
)
Y2 +
(
N −M − |Mˆ|−1
N −M
)
Y −
∑
i∈Mˆ∪{M}
|X i|≥
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣.
107
For any Mˆ, |Mˆ|= N−M−1, (6.21) becomes equivalent to Y2 ≥
∑
M≤i≤N |X i|, which
holds with equality (since Y2 =
∑
M≤i≤N |X i|). For any Mˆ, 0 ≤ |Mˆ|< N −M − 1,
by dividing both sides of (6.21) by K and applying Lemma 23, it becomes obvious
that (6.21) holds so long as
N −M − |Mˆ|−1
N −M ZM−1 +
|Mˆ|+1
N −MZN−1 > ZM+|Mˆ|. (6.22)
Taking V1 = M − 1, V = M + |Mˆ| and V2 = N − 1, Lemma 25 yields (6.22) since
0 ≤ |Mˆ|< N −M − 1.
Theorem 17. {r˜(1)i , r˜(2)i } is optimal w.r.t. LP (6.1).
Proof. By Lemma 27, the optimal value of LP (6.5) is r∗ = 1
M−1(Y1 + Y ). Thus, the
dual of LP (6.1) is given by
max.
∑
N⊂[N ]
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣sN + r∗ · s∗ (6.23)
s.t.
∑
N⊂[N ]
sN1{i∈N} + s∗ ≤ 1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.24)∑
N⊂[N ]:
[M ]⊂N
sN1{i∈N} ≤ 1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.25)
(sN ≥ 0,∀N ⊂ [N ]),
where s∗ is unrestricted in sign. Take s˜∗ = − M−1
N−M and s˜[N ]\{1} = · · · = s˜[N ]\{N} =
1
N−M , and s˜N = 0 for any other N . Obviously, {s˜N , s˜∗} meets (6.24) with equality
since
∑
N s˜N1{i∈N} + s˜
∗ = 1. Also, {s˜N , s˜∗} meets (6.25) since
∑
N :[M ]⊂N s˜N1{i∈N}
is equal to 1 (for every 1 ≤ i ≤M) or N−M−1
N−M (for every M < i ≤ N). Thus, {s˜N , s˜∗}
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is feasible w.r.t. LP (6.23). Now, it is easy to see that
∑
N⊂[N ]
∣∣∣∣ ⋂
i/∈N
X i
∣∣∣∣sN + r∗ · s∗ = 1N −M (Y2 − Y ).
Also, we have ∑
i∈[N ]
r˜
(1)
i + r˜
(2)
i =
1
N −M (Y2 − Y ).
Thus, the duality principle implies that {r˜(1)i , r˜(2)i } and {s˜N , s˜∗} are optimal w.r.t. LP (6.1)
and (6.23), respectively, and the optimal value is equal to 1
N−M (Y2 − Y ).
6.4 Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas 24 and 25
Lemmas 24 and 25 are both related to the function ZV (depending on N, p and
V ), and thus, for convenience, we repeat the definition:
ZV =
(1− p)N−V − (1− p)N
1− (1− p)N . (6.26)
Proof of Lemma 24. We need to prove that
ZV1
V1
<
ZV2
V2
, (6.27)
for any 0 < V1 < V2 < N and any 0 < p < 1. By substituting (6.26) into (6.27), (6.27)
holds so long as
1
V1
− 1
V2
>
(1− p)−V1
V1
− (1− p)
−V2
V2
. (6.28)
Since V1 and V2 are positive integers, (6.28) holds so long as
1
n
− 1
n+ 1
>
(1− p)−n
n
− (1− p)
−n−1
n+ 1
,
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or equivalently,
(1− p)n+1 > 1− (n+ 1)p,
for any integer n > 0 and any 0 < p < 1, which obviously holds (by the Bernoulli’s
inequality).
Proof of Lemma 25. We need to prove
V2 − V
V2 − V1ZV1 +
V − V1
V2 − V1ZV2 > ZV , (6.29)
for any 0 < V1 < V < V2 < N , and any 0 < p < 1. Substituting (6.26)
into (6.29), (6.29) holds so long as
ϕ(p) > 0,
where
ϕ(p) =
V2 − V
V2 − V1 (1− p)
V2−V1 +
V − V1
V2 − V1 − (1− p)
V2−V .
It is easy to see that limp→0 ϕ(p) = 0 and limp→1 ϕ(p) = V−V1V2−V1 > 0 (since V > V1
and V2 > V1). Also,
dϕ(p)
dp
= (V2 − V )((1− p)V2−V−1 − (1− p)V2−V1−1) > 0
(since V2 > V > V1). Thus, ϕ(p) > 0, for any 0 < p < 1.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE) is an excellent strategy for devices in a wire-
less local area network (WLAN) to exchange packets efficiently without the help of
a base station or an access point. However, due to the Peer-to-Peer nature of CDE
strategy, the quality of both the channel and the clients are not guaranteed to be
as good as traditional WLAN network with a central data source. In addition, in
various scenarios in real life, special requirements from the type of service or from
the vendors have certain limitation over the CDE strategy. The original algorithm
of CDE does not incorporate these requirements well.
In this work, we address those issues and studied multiple extensions of Cooper-
ative Data Exchange (CDE) problem.
In case of presence of eavesdropper in the network, the results of Weakly Secure
Data Exchange problem show that when certain conditions on the side information of
the clients is met, using the weakly secure data exchange strategy allows the clients
to have data exchange without loss of throughput. This statement is true even when
an evesdropper has certain packets as side information.
In the scenarios where clients are faulty or adversarial, we found the encoding
scheme that allows the clients to transmit redundancy information. The redundant
information allows the “good” clients to be able to recover the correct information
even if some of the transmissions are lost or erroneous.
We then considered the scenario when the presence of clients are limited by
deadlines, e.g. due to mobility. We proved that this problem is NP-hard and cannot
have a very efficient algorithm. However, if we want to maximize the increase of
knowledge of all the client before the deadlines, an algorithm with an approximation
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ratio upper bounded by 2 is proposed.
Lastly, we studied the case where a subgroup of clients has priority over other
clients and need to be satisfied first. When the packets are randomly distributed
over all the clients, we provide a close form solution to the problem of finding the
encoding scheme that cost minimum to satisfy all of the clients according to their
priority.
The results of these problems enlarge the vision of research in CDE strategy
and provides foundations for its implementation in real network. Some open prob-
lems we discovered will drive new researches in this field as well as certain fields in
mathematics.
Multiple directions can be followed by future work. On Weakly Secure Data
Exchange problem, we will complete the proof of Conjecture 1 based on one of
the reformulations mentioned in Section 3. In our model of Erasure Correcting
Data Exchange problem, we only considered the worst case where all transmissions
from a client are lost. In the future work, we will investigate the cases of partial
transmission lost, which may be more practical in some scenarios. In the Cooperative
Data Exchange with Deadline problem, an approximation algorithm for DED-SAT
model is still open for future work. Another interesting model similar to CDED
problem is to consider deadlines of packets instead of clients.
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